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Abstract 
The paper examines the determinants of capital structure of firms listed on FTSE 350 over a period 
from 2002 to 2011 using panel data. The sample of this study involves 178 listed firms from nine 
different industries. Several theories of capital structure are reviewed in order to achieve the testable 
hypothesis regarding the capital structure decision of UK based firms. To test the hypothesis we have 
utilised pooled ordinary least square, random effects, fixed effects models and ANOVA test. Our 
results suggest that profitability and firm size are positively related to both long-term and short-term 
leverage. Whereas, growth opportunities and earning volatility is negatively related to both type of 
gearing ratio. Tangibility is negatively associated with short-term leverage and positively related to 
long-term leverage. The presence of non-debt tax shield has a positive impact in short-term leverage 
and opposite effect in the long-run. Overall, from the results we can say that firm size and profitability 
shows significant relation with both the gearing ratios and non-debt tax shield with short-term 
leverage and growth with long-term leverage. Hence, these independent variables have statistically 
significant impact on the capital structure of the UK based firms. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background Information: 
Capital Structure Theory is one of the most popular theories in the financial sector from the past half 
century. Modigliani and Miller in 1958 and 1963 proposed the initial theory, which suggested that in 
perfect market, the value of the firm is independent of its financial decisions and the corrected model 
in 1963 included the effect of tax in the capital structure. After that, a great number of theories have 
been proposed to provide a better understanding of the variation in the amount of leverage level 
across firms. The theories argue that the decision of capital structure depends upon characteristics that 
would determine various cost and benefits associated with different kind of capital options i.e. debt 
and equity. Because of this there has been massive amount of empirical and theoretical work with the 
aim of providing a perfect capital structure theory but none of them in the past 50 years has been able 
to provide a conclusive theory and most the these theories revolve around a few theoretical models of 
the past. 
The initial theory of capital structure based on two irrelevant propositions given in the MM theory, 
which avoids real life things like taxes, cost of financial distress, bankruptcy cost, agency cost, 
transaction cost and asymmetric information. With all these missing aspects, the capital structure 
theory will not give us a perfect capital structure. 
The new and improved theory for capital structure started to include all the real life essential elements 
and majorly based on two rival and opposing theories, Static Trade-Off Theory of Capital Structure 
and Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure. Alan Kraus and Robert H. Litzenberger in 1973 
brought in the Static Trade-Off Theory that mainly highlighted the cost and benefits of including debt 
in the capital structure. The main advantage mentioned was the tax deduction of interest paid but debt 
financing also increases the probability of bankruptcy cost and increases the agency problem between 
stockholders and bondholders. 
The next theory, which is the opposing theory to the Static Trade-Off Theory, is the Pecking Order 
Theory of Capital Structure. The Theory was originated with research of Donaldson in 1961 and later 
the research was used by Myers and Majluf in 1984 they came up with the Pecking Order Theory. The 
theory suggested that the firm should follow a certain predefined order while raising finance. The 
order suggested in the theory mentioned that retained earnings are the first preference for financing 
followed by debt as the second choice and equity as the last resort for raising finance. The theory does 
not predict any optimal debt ratio rather it suggest that firm capital structure is the result of firms 
financing requirement over the time and its attempt to minimise adverse selection cost. (Baker & 
Martin, 2011) 
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Beside this, there are few more theories to help us to get a better view on the capital structure puzzle. 
The Agency Cost Theory gives us the information about the conflict between the shareholders and the 
manager and the conflict between debt holders and equity holders because of the financing decision. 
Baker and Wurgler in 2002 gave the other theory which is known as Market Timing Theory, which 
argues that the capital structure is majorly related to historical market value. ³&DSLWDOVWUXFWXUHLVWKH
FXPXODWLYHRXWFRPHRIWKHSDVWDWWHPSWWRWLPHWKHHTXLW\PDUNHW´ (Baker & Wurgler, 2002) 
To choose the best theory among all the theories is not easy. Every theory is unique and provides 
explanation under different conditions. Therefore, there are many empirical studies attempting to 
analyse the capital structure decisions. Titman and Wessels (1988), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and 
many other researchers and scholars used cross sectional data to test the theoretical determinants of 
capital structure and Scholars like Ozkan (2001) used panel data to explain the determinants of capital 
structure. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives: 
The main idea behind this dissertation is to provide a detailed understanding of how firms adjust their 
capital structure. The results of the research will be analysed and compared with the previously 
established theories and researches. We have used UK market as the target market, as it is a developed 
market and gives us the results in accordance to that. The research will help us to understand the 
following question: 
x :KDWDUHWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVUHODWHGWRILUPV¶VKRUW-term and long-term leverage? 
x +RZWKHVHGHWHUPLQDQWVHIIHFWWKHILUP¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHGHFLVLRQ" 
x Is there any particular theory that turns out to be more significant because of the empirical 
results? 
Apart from the above-mentioned questions, the research will help us to establish a better theoretical 
and practical intellect about how the firms determine the optimal mixture of the capital structure. The 
paper also works to develops further information on capital structure of UK specific firms. In the 
research conducted by Ozkan (2001), he mentioned that there is not a very great amount of empirical 
work done on capital structure of UK based firms. 
1.3 Research Motivation 
The decision of financing is one of the most difficult tasks for the finance managers. Even after half a 
decade there is no concrete way through which a firm can choose between the debt financing and 
equity financing. Both the methods of financing have their own merits and de-merits. There is always 
new conflicts occurring with every new research and studies conducted by scholars. The 
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inconsistency among the arguments of various scholars and researchers motivated me to take on this 
topic as my research topic. Now we have various new statistical tools and software that will help us to 
get a more precise result. The research is based on FTSE 350 listed on London Stock Exchange 
helped the research to have a developed economies perspective as the companies listed in FTSE 350 
represent the companies based in UK. With the comments of scholars like Ozkan and more about the 
unavailability of much empirical evidences on UK based firms regarding the capital structure 
decisions motivated me more to explore this topic in respect to UK based firms. 
1.4 Structure Overview 
The dissertation has been organised into six different chapters. We have discussed the extensive 
amount of literature available on the topic capital structure in Chapter 2. Modigliani and Miller gave 
the initial theory and later many scholars introduced various modern theories of capital structure. In 
the next chapter, we have discussed the various determinants and its impact on the capital structure of 
the firm with the support of empirical studies done previously. Later Chapter 4 discussed the 
methodology adopted for the research and the main model of research presented in that chapter along 
with the proxies used for the independent and dependent variables. Chapter 4 also discussed the data 
collection and sample set creation techniques. In Chapter 5, we have discussed and analysed the 
results. Moreover, in the last chapter, we have discussed the summary of the findings along with the 
conclusion and limitations of the study are mentioned.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The Capital Structure Theory is a theory that focuses on explaining the mix of debt and equity as 
source of raising real finance by the corporate. There is a lot of research on capital structure and most 
of them focus on the equity and debt proportions in balance sheets. There is no universally accepted 
theory of the debt and equity choice (Myers S. C., 2001). The overall understanding of the optimal 
capital structure is one of the most questionable theories because there are so much different results 
from different researchers. 
The origin of the literature for the capital structure started with the paper presented by Franco 
Modigliani and Merton H. Miller presented almost 50 years back. The paper based on certain 
irrelevance proposition and there have been a lot of further papers put forward by researchers and 
scholars supplementing the original paper by adding friction to the research which was previously 
omitted in the original research framework Modigliani and Miller (1958) (Chirinko & Singha, 2000). 
Previous literature said that some of the most productive responses to the MM results have come from 
those who did not feel able to accept the conclusion that the financial policy is irrelevant (Stiglitz, 
1988). 
According to Schwartz (1959), in real world there is uncertainty, lack of knowledge as to relevant 
variables make optimum solution for capital structure a difficult achievement. In addition, financing is 
matter of taste and preference of risk and hence ownership or firm decision or a unique decision is not 
possible. Myers also said that there is no universal theory of debt and equity choice but there are few 
useful ones. "The capital structure of the firm" seems to include only those sources of funds that are 
part of securities, which seems to be a very narrow approach (Schwartz, 1959). In addition, there is 
great amount of research work available to shed light on the difference levels of debt and equity levels 
of the firm. 
We can explain the capital structure by using different theories although these theories based on 
different ideas but they are not mutually exclusive. These include the Modigliani and Miller (MM) 
Propositions, Trade-Off Theory, Pecking Order Theory, Agency Cost Model and Market Timing 
Theory. In addition, some of the basic concepts of the following theories are mention below: 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Theory Propositions of the theory with regard to capital structure decisions 
Modigliani & Miller 
Propositions (1958) 
The value of the firm is determined by the left hand side of balance sheet i.e. 
real assets and irrelevant of the how much debt is there in the liability side. 
Therefore, the firm should invest in positive NPV projects (Brealey, Myers, 
& Allen, 2010) 
Trade-Off Theory The firms seek debt levels that balance the tax advantages of additional debt 
against the costs of possible financial distress (Myers S. C., 2001) 
Pecking Order 
Theory 
The firm will borrow, rather than issuing equity, when internal cash flow is 
not sufficient to fund capital expenditures (Myers S. C., 2001) 
Agency Cost Model 
The agency cost arises because of the conflict between different stake holder 
and it can be reduced by involving more debt (Jensen & Meckling, Theory 
Of The Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 1976)  
                               Table 2.1: A brief description of the Theoretical Models 
There is significant difference for debt employed by different firms; the reason for this can be 
explained by examining the different theories mentioned above. 
2.1 The Modigliani and Miller Propositions: 
The framework produced by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller in 1958 gave the idea behind one 
of the most important and debated topic of corporate finance. All the research paper related to capital 
structure theory mainly based on the initial idea given by the Modigliani and Miller. Their paper is 
one of the most discussed, researched and criticized paper. ³7KH&RVWRI&DSLWDO&RUSRUDWLRQ)LQDQFH
DQG WKH 7KHRU\ RI ,QYHVWPHQW´ SDSHU RSHQHG GRRU IRU QXPHURXV UHVHDUFK HPSLULFDO VWXGLHV DQG
theoretical studies in the field of corporate finance literature. 
The paper put forwarded by Modigliani and Miller was based on certain propositions that are known 
DV ³7KH&DSLWDO6WUXFWXUH ,UUHOHYDQF\3URSRVLWLRQV´7KHUH DUH FHUWDLQ DVVXPSWLRQs to the model of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem. The main assumption for the model was that there is no 
transaction cost and tax and there is a perfect capital market. Other assumptions along the above two 
are there is homogenous expectation for the investor regarding the payoff and risk, homogenous risk 
class for all the firms, perpetual growth rate, there is no taxes for individuals and firms, no 
information and transaction cost, firms and investors can borrow and lend at same rate, no bankruptcy 
cost associated in raising debt, equal information available to insiders and the outsiders, firm issue 
only risk free debt and risky equity. (Villamil, 2008) 
The Modigliani-Miller Theorem comprises four distinct results from a series of papers (1958, 1961, 
and 1963). TKH ILUVWSURSRVLWLRQHVWDEOLVKHV WKDWXQGHU FHUWDLQ FRQGLWLRQV D ILUP¶VGHEW-equity ratio 
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GRHV QRW DIIHFW LWV PDUNHW YDOXH 7KH VHFRQG SURSRVLWLRQ HVWDEOLVKHV WKDW D ILUP¶V OHYHUDJH KDV QR
effect on its weighted average cost of capital (i.e., the cost of equity capital is a linear function of the 
debt-equity ratio). The third proposition establishes that firm market value is independent of its 
dividend policy. The fourth proposition establishes that equity-holders are indifferent abRXWWKHILUP¶V
financial policy (Villamil, 2008). The capital structure can be explained with the first two 
propositions. 
2.1.1 Proposition I 
The first proposition under the M&M Theory states that the debt-equity ratio does not affect the 
ILUP¶V PDUNHt value, in other word the firm is independent of the financial policy it follows. The 
ILUP¶V value depends upon the returns of the projects it invest in and not by the securities it issues for 
raising finance. Proposition I says that value of firm is a constant, regardless of the proportions of debt 
and equity, provided that the assets and growth opportunities on the left-hand side of the balance sheet 
DUHKHOG FRQVWDQW ³)LQDQFLDO OHYHUDJH - that is, the proportion of debt financing is irrelevant. This 
leverage-irrelevance result generalizes to any mix of securities issued by the firm (Myers S. C., 2001). 
Therefore, 
VU = PV (CF)  and  VL = VE + VD 
And according the proposition I both of them are equal  
VU = PV (CF) = VL = VE + VD 
Where: VU is value of unlevered firm 
 
PV (CF) is present value of cash flows from real asset 
 VL is value of unlevered firm 
 
VD is value of Debt 
 VE is value of Equity. 
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The independence of the firm value can be graphically represented as: 
                            Figure 2.1 
 
Myers (2001) has illustrated the Modigliani and Miller Proposition I with the help of market value 
balance sheet where total firms value V equals to the market value of debt D plus equity E. MM 
Theory says that the value of the firm remains constant regardless of the proportion of debt and equity 
in capital structure provided that the assets and growth opportunities on the left-hand side of the 
balance sheet are held constant (Myers S. C., 2001). 
 
                               
                                  Table 2.2: Market-value Balance Sheet (Myers S. C., 2001) 
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Therefore, we can be seen that according the proposition I the value of the firm is due to the assets on 
the left hand side and not by the proportions of debt and equity issued by the firm to raise finance. 
2.1.2 Proposition II 
7KH0	0WKHRU\¶V VHFRQG LPSRUWDQW LQVLJKW is that even debt is less costly for firms to issue than 
equity, issuing debt causes the required return on the remaining equity to rise (Megginson, Smart, & 
Gitman, 2007). It is also said that according to the core financial principle, the shareholders of levered 
firm ask for more returns as compared to all-equity firms. The expected rate of return on the common 
stock of a levered firm increases in proportion to the debt-equity ratio, expressed in market value; the 
rate of increase depends on the spread between the expected rate of return on a portfolio of all the 
ILUP¶VVHFXULWLHVDQGWKHH[SHFWHGUHWXUQRQWKHGHEW (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2010). Therefore, the 
proposition II states that the cost of equity is a linear function to the debt-equity ratio of the firm. The 
equation for the second proposition is shown below: 
ݎ஺ ൌ ൬ ܦܦ ൅ ܧ ൈ ݎ஽൰ ൅ ൬ ܧܦ ൅ ܧ ൈ ݎா൰ 
Where:  ݎ஺  
  ݎ஽  
  ݎா    
  ܦ  
  ܧǤ 
The above equation is the weighted average cost of capital that is independent of capital structure if 
the proposition holds and return on the assets is constant. As the M&M second proposition state that 
any change in the leverage cause an offsetting change in the required return in equity. Thus making 
the left hand side of the equation unchanged. Moreover, by rearranging the above equation we can 
get: 
ݎா ൌ ݎ஺ ൅ ሺݎ஺ െ ݎ஽ሻܦܧ  
The working of proposition II on the equation with weighed average cost of capital can be explained 
with the help of a graph: 
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                        Figure 2.2: M&M Proposition II Illustrated (Megginson, Smart, & Gitman, 2007) 
The M&M Theory is based on certain assumption that is very difficult to achieve in real life. This led 
new researchers to modify and reject some of the assumptions to provide a more conclusive result for 
a better and optimum capital structure. The omission of tax and other real life elements were the 
major weak point of the theory. Ignoring tax during the time where corporate taxes were high and the 
interest on debt was low was a major point that was ignored in this theory. Modigliani and Miller 
themselves included the corporate tax into consideration by making a correction paper in 1963. The 
correction made the benefits of tax advantage of debt financing made debt a more attractive option for 
finance. 
MM propositions were ideal but not realistic. The model overlooked so many real world element that 
it became one of the most controversial and contradictory theory. The theory ignored elements like 
bankruptcy and distress cost, corporate taxes, agency issues and market imperfections. It also ignored 
the use of hybrid financial instruments such as convertible bonds, etc. (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 
2010). This omission leads to a weaker theory that requires a lot more research to provide a better 
answer for the optimal capital structure. 
2.2 The Trade-Off Theory 
The M&M Theory is criticized because of the ignorance of some of the essential real life elements in 
the theory. The Trade-Off Theory suggested that the optimum level is attained when the present value 
of tax saving due to further borrowing is just offset by increases in present value of cost of distress 
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(Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2010). In simple terms when a company includes debt in the capital 
structure and the interest paid for the debt is tax deductible and known as tax shield. However, with 
the inclusion of debt the firm gets exposed to bankruptcy cost. In case if the company is not 
performing well and the cash generated from its operations is not enough to pay the debt obligation 
then the company will go bankrupt. The tax shield on interest is the difference between the tax that 
that would be paid by the firm which has no debt and the firm which has debt (Wrightsman, 1978). 
The Trade-Off Theory originated from the M&M Theory with adding real life essential elements like 
market imperfections, taxes and distress cost. It states that the firm will borrow up to the point where 
the marginal value of tax shields on additional debt is just offset by the increase in the present value of 
possible costs of financial distress. Financial distress refers to the costs of bankruptcy or 
reorganization, and to the agency costs that arise when the firm's creditworthiness is in doubt (Myers 
S. C., 2001). The theory suggests that the target debt ratio can vary from firm to firm. The firms with 
safe and tangible assets and with plenty of taxable tend to have high target debt ratio as compared to 
the companies with risky and intangible assets. The firms with less taxable income prefer majorly on 
equity financing rather than debt. Firms choose the debt level that steadies the tax advantage of adding 
addition debt against the cost of distress it brings. 
2.2.1 Taxes 
The omission of taxes in M&M Theory was one of the main controversial aspects of the theory. The 
interest paid by the company to its debt holders is tax-deductible expense according to corporate 
income tax. This led the bondholders to escape the taxation at the corporate level. Modigliani and 
Miller also edited their model in 1963 by adding the impact of corporate tax on the capital structure. 
According to the new model: 
 VL=VU+PV (tax-Shield) 
Where:  VL is the value of the levered firm 
  VU is the value of the unlevered firm 
  PV (tax-Shield) is the present value of the tax-shield. 
So according to the above equation the value of the levered firm is a linear function with the tax 
shield. According to that, by increasing the debt to the maximum level will provide us with the 
maximum value of the firm. This makes the optimum capital structure extreme and embarrassing, i.e. 
100% debt financing (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2010). Brealey, Myers and Allen (2010) stated 
several reasons that lead to the overstatement of the interest tax-shield. First, the firms think debt as 
perpetual and constant but it is difficult to do that as the debt level changes with the profit and 
fluctuation in the value of the firm. Secondly, the firms not always get the marginal tax rate as 35% as 
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mentioned in the M&M revised article. And interest tax shield is only useful if the firm has profits 
against which the tax shield can be utilised and no firm can be sure about future profits and in case of 
no profits the tax-shield is of no use. 
The debt shield depends majorly on the tax system of the countries. If the countries does not allow 
carry back or carry forward of losses then the debt fLQDQFLQJGRHVQ¶Wprovides the advantage of debt 
shield always as for the companies situated in countries whose tax system allows carry forward or 
carry back the losses. Adedeji (1998) found that the UK system discourages debt financing, as does 
the classical tax system in US. The tax system in US allows the companies to carry back or carry 
forward the losses of a particular financial year. In simpler words, the firms are allowed to get a tax 
refund prior to their tax payments and reduction of taxes in future. This led the US firm to bank 
heavily on debts to finance even after their leverage deviates from the target ratio. 
'H$QJHORDQG0DVXOLVVD\WKDWWKH0LOOHU¶V LUUHOHYDQF\WKHRUHPLVYHU\VHQVLWLYHWRUHDOLVWLF
and simple modification in corporate tax code. They said that the existence of non-debt corporate tax 
shields such as depreciation deductions and investment tax credit is enough to upturn the leverage 
irrelevancy theorem. The presence debt shield will reduce the need of the non-debt tax shield. So by 
involving more debt in the capital structure it gets more expensive to add more debt financing as it 
turns out to be more expensive as the non-debt tax shield becomes less useful. Even Myers (1984) 
suggested that the theory presented by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) is better than Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) because it is less extreme. 
2.2.2 Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Cost 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), a firm can increase its value to the maximum level by 
adding as much debt as possible. But this is based on the assumption that there is perfect market, but 
in real life this is not possible and there are elements like bankruptcy cost and financial distress which 
PDNHVGHEWDQRWVRDWWUDFWLYHRSWLRQIRUDFKLHYLQJWKHPD[LPXPOHYHORIILUP¶VYDOXHDQGIRUFHWKH
value maximising firm to trade-off between the cost and benefits of debt. 
Myers (2001) explained the financial distress as the bankruptcy cost and reorganization cost and the 
agency cost arises when the firm loses it creditworthiness. Myers in the article The Determinant of 
Capital Borrowing (1977) explained the gap in the modern financial theory in respect to the debt 
financing. He explained that even after the presence of debt-tax shields the companies do not prefer to 
maximise the value of the firm by going for all debt financing. He gave the reason that discourage 
borrowing even after the presence of the tax shield is the presence of the bankruptcy cost which 
includes cost like transaction cost and cost of reorganization. The use of debt exposes the firms to the 
bankruptcy risk and financial distress. Robichek and Myers (1966) said that the cost of bankruptcy 
emerges when the company is under the threat of bankruptcy and even if it saves itself from that the 
cost still exists. Initial work on this matter also includes Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Robichek and 
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Myers (1966), among others have debated that debt policy is irrelevant in the presence of bankruptcy 
and reorganization cost. 
Haugen and Senbet (1978) explained the bankruptcy as an event when fixed obligations towards 
creditors cannot be fulfil and which lead to transfer of ownership and reorganization of capital 
structure of the firm. The cost related to transfer can be categorised under two categories i.e. direct 
and indirect.  In the direct cost items like legal, accounting and trustee fees and possible denial of 
income tax loss carry-overs and carry-backs are included. Whereas indirect cost includes cost related 
to the opportunity costs resulting from disruption in firm-supplier or firm-customer relationships that 
are associated with the transfer of ownership or control. They also mentioned that the indirect costs 
are insignificant or non-existent if the customer or the supplier act rationally. The indirect costs are 
hard to measure but usually the magnitude of indirect cost is much more than the direct cost of 
bankruptcy. 
Myers (1984) mentioned that the literature on cost of financial distress supports two qualitative 
thoughts concerning mainly the bankruptcy cost and financial distress cost in accordance to capital 
structure. He suggests that risky firms should borrow less because of the high variance level in 
income, which makes the probability of default and not meeting the interest obligation high. Whereas 
the safer firms with stable cash flows and income should borrow more debt before the expected cost 
of financial distress offsets the tax advantage of adding debt to the capital structure. And the next 
thing Myers (1984) mentioned is the firms with tangible assets in place having active second hand 
markets tends to borrow less when compared with firms with specialised, intangible assets or valuable 
growth opportunities. The reason behind this given was that the expected cost of financial distress not 
only depend upon the probability of trouble but also on the value lost if any trouble happens. 
Therefore, the firms with intangible specialised and growth opportunities tend to lose more value as 
compared to other firms (Myers S. C., 1984). 
The presence of financial distress will reduce the wealth of shareholders, debt holders and equity 
holders. Myers (1984), Fama and French (2002) and Titman and Wessels (1988) and many other 
scholars stated that bankruptcy cost and financial distress is necessary for the firms to get to a decision 
of optimal capital structure. They mentioned that large firms and firms with huge profits tend to have 
less cost of financial distress and thus they prefer to have higher debt in comparison to book assets of 
theirs. 
2.2.3 Optimal Capital Structure 
The idea of optimum capital structure was given in the theory proposed by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) but the theory was based on certain irrelevance propositions. Further the effect of tax benefits 
and cost of financial distress and bankruptcy cost has been included in the modern theory of optimal 
FDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH)LUP¶VRSWLPXPGHEWUDWLRLVGHWHUPLQHd by the trade-off between cost and benefits 
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of borrowing debt. The benefit of having tax shield due to extra debt is compensated with the cost of 
financial distress, which helps to determine the optimum debt level for the firm. There are some 
previous papers on optimal capital structure by Robichek and Myers (1966) and Baxter (1967) etc. 
Later scholars like Bradley et al. (1984), Harris and Raviv (1990) formed the model for optimal 
structure. The model to attain optimum capital structure given by them, 
  VL = VU + PV (Tax-Shield) - PV (Financial Distress Costs) 
The value of the levered firm is equal to the value of the unlevered firm and adding the present value 
of the tax shield arises due adding debt in the capital structure and subtracting the present value of the 
cost of financial distress due to debt. This gives us the idea about the cost and benefits attached with 
the debt financing. This leaves the firm to choose a perfect combination in which the tax shield 
advantage is more than the cost of financial distress so that they can maximise the ILUP¶V value. As we 
increase the level of debt then the probability of financial distress and cost tends to increase. And this 
will reduce the advantage of the tax shield and eventually the advantage of tax shield will disappear. 
 
  
       Figure 2.3: The Static Trade-Off Theory of Capital Structure (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999) 
From the Figure 2.3 we can see that the cost of financial distress is quite less till a certain point and 
from that on it increases rapidly with increase in borrowing. And if the firm keeps on borrowing debt 
then the firm loses the tax shield advantage from borrowing additional debt and eventually the tax 
advantage disappears as the firm is likely to go bankrupt (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2010). 
2.3 Pecking Order Theory 
The theory that challenges the Trade-off Theory for providing the solution for the capital structure 
puzzle is the Pecking Order Theory. The theory took shape from the study done by Donaldson (1961). 
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The Pecking Order Theory is considered the main alterative and the strongest challenge to the Static 
Trade-Off Theory (Megginson, Smart, & Gitman, 2007). Myers and Majluf (1984) further developed 
the study. Donaldson (1961) mentioned in his paper that the management prefer to finance their need 
with internal funds rather than opting for issue of common stock. Based on the results of Donaldson 
(1961) that managers prefer internal financing rather than issuing new shares; Myers and Majluf 
(1984) assumed that the investors are unaware of the true value of the existing assets and the future 
opportunities available to the firm except in the perfect financial market. Moreover, they argued that 
managers act in the interest of existing shareholders, and refuse to issue undervalued shares unless the 
transfer from old to new stockholders is more than offset by the net present value of the growth 
opportunity (Myers S. C., 2001). The value of share falls because of the information with the 
investors is interpreted as bad news and even some companies prefer not to issue if the asset-in-place 
is undervalued even if they have a positive net present value opportunity. Megginson et al. (2007) 
explained the two main assumptions behind the Pecking Order Theory. First, that the managers have 
EHWWHULQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHLURZQILUP¶VSURVSHFWVWKDQWKHLQYHVWRUVLQIURPWKHRXWVLGHDV\PPHWULF
information) and managers works in the best interests of the existing shareholders. There were many 
other scholars (Narayanan, 1988; Heinkel and Zechner, 1990) who later followed the model of Myers 
and Majluf (1984) and came with the similar results. 
The information asymmetry causes the firms to choose internal capital rather than debt financing or 
equity financing. The adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) argues that information 
asymmetry can cause the investors to be les informed about the firm and lead to the problem of under-
investment and the firm may give up on positive NPV projects if they feel that the equity is 
undervalued. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), managers find it difficult to convey all the 
information to the outsiders and the problem will vanish if the information can be conveyed without 
any cost. The model by Myers and Majluf (1984) was based on certain assumptions and some of them 
are, (1) Perfect Capital Markets; (2) No Transaction Cost for issuing Stocks; (3) market value of the 
ILUP¶VVKDUHVHTXDOVWKHLUH[SHFWHGIXWXUHYDOXHFRQGLWLRQDORQZKDWHYHULQIRUPDWLRQWKHPDUNHWKDV
(4) The firm has one existing asset and one opportunity requiring investment which can be financed 
by issuing stock, using cash balance or selling a marketable security which is known as financial slack 
in the model (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
In order to deal with the problem of adverse selection, firms try to follow the pecking order of the 
funds available and will utilise the least risky funds. The Pecking Order Theory of capital structure 
shows that the firm uses a hierarchy while making the financing decisions. The order of preference 
used by the firms is (1) Internal financing; (2) Debt; (3) Convertible securities (4) Preferred stock (5) 
Common stock (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2010). Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) said that the 
Pecking Order Model is not for choosing the target debt level; the model is more of treating the debt 
ratio as cumulative consequences over a period of time due to financial decisions compatible to 
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hierarchy. They also said that the problem of ILQDQFLDOGHILFLWDULVHVZKHQWKHILUP¶VLQWHUQDOIXQGLQJ
is not sufficient for investments and paying of dividends. 
According to Shyam-Sunder the Pecking Order Theory does not define a target debt ratio, according 
WR WKH WKHRU\ ILUP¶VSULRULW\ LVQRW WKHDGYDQWDJHRI WD[-VKLHOGDQGFRVWRI ILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVV)LUP¶V
leverage alters because of imbalance of external and internal financing. Specially like internal cash 
flow, dividend payment, investment opportunity. The firms with high profits and limited investment 
opportunity prefer to have low debt ratios. If the firm in not able to finance an investment opportunity 
then it opt for increasing the debt ratio. The model predicted that the leverage is related with the two 
determinants which are profitability and investment opportunity. 
Overall Pecking Order Theory implies: 
1) Firms prefer internal to external finance. (Information asymmetries are assumed relevant only for 
external financing.) 
2) Dividends are "sticky," so that dividend cuts are not used to finance capital expenditure, and so that 
changes in cash requirements are not soaked up in short-term dividend changes. In other words, 
changes in net cash show up as changes in external financing. 
3) If external funds are required for capital investment, firms will issue the safest security first, that is, 
debt before equity. If internally generated cash flow exceeds capital investment, the surplus is used to 
pay down debt rather than repurchasing and retiring equity. As the requirement for external financing 
increases, the firm will work down the pecking order, from safe to riskier debt, perhaps to convertible 
securities or preferred stock, and finally to equity as a last resort. 
4) Each firm's debt ratio therefore reflects its cumulative requirement for external financing (Myers S. 
C., 2001). 
2.3.1 Criticism of Pecking Order Theory 
As most of the theories of Capital Structure, the Pecking Order Theory is not free from criticism. 
Liesz (2001) mentioned some of the major errors in the theory, according to the author the Pecking 
Order theory wasQ¶W able to explain the influence of taxes, financial distress, security issuance costs, 
DJHQF\FRVWVRUWKHVHWRILQYHVWPHQWRSSRUWXQLWLHVDYDLODEOHWRDILUPXSRQWKDWILUP¶VDFWXDOFDSLWDO
structure. It also ignores the problems that can arise when a ILUP¶V PDQDJHUV DFFXPXODWH VR PXFK
financial slack that they become immune to market discipline.  In such a case, it would be possible for 
DILUP¶VPDQDJHPHQWWRSUHFOXGHHYHUEHLQJSHQDOL]HGthrough a low security price and if augmented 
with non-financial takeover defences, immune to being removed in a hostile acquisition.  For these 
reasons pecking order theory is offered as a complement rather than a substitution for the traditional 
trade-off model (Liesz, 2001). The theory ignores significant agency problems that arise when too 
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much financial slack makes managers immune to market discipline. And empirical studies do not find 
a negative relation between leverage and profitability (Megginson, Smart, & Gitman, 2007). Research 
by Frank and Goyal (2003) suggested that equity also work same as debt in case of financial deficit, 
the results contradicts the pattern which was given according to the Pecking Order Theory. 
2.3.2 Pecking Order Theory vs. Trade-Off Theory 
Both of these theories are not fully independent of each other in explaining the optimal capital 
structure and thus criticized by many researchers. There is literature which has compared the two 
theories empirically and theoretically [Fama and French (2002), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
Watson and Wilson (2002) and Griner and Gordon (1995)]. Both the theories are not totally exclusive 
so here is a comparison between both the theories.  
The Trade-Off Model is useful for explaining corporate debt levels; Pecking Order Theory is superior 
for explaining capital structure changes (Liesz, 2001). The Trade-Off Theory is more of explaining 
the Optimal Capital Structure by weighing the cost of financial distress and benefits of tax-shield 
gained because of additional debt in the capital structure. Whereas the Pecking Order theory helps in 
the explanation of capital structure changes, which allows for the dynamics of the firm to dictate an 
optimal capital structure for a given firm at any particular point in time (Copeland, Weston, & 
Shashtri, 2003). The major difference between the two theories has been well defined and explained 
by Liesz (2001). 
 
                Pecking Order Theory                      Trade-Off Theory 
          Considers managerial motivations   Conforms with value maximizing construct 
         Allows for a dynamic capital structure   Assumes a relatively static capital structure 
       Considers the influence of financial slack and   
availability of positive-NPV projects 
  Considers the influence of taxes, transaction 
costs, and financial distress 
       Acknowledges capitDOPDUNHW³VLJQDOV´   ,JQRUHVWKHLPSDFWRIFDSLWDOPDUNHW³VLJQDOV´ 
       Acknowledges proprietary data concerns   Ignores concerns regarding proprietary data 
       Explains many real-world practices   Cannot explain many real-world practices 
 Table 2.3: Comparison of Trade-off and Pecking Order Theory Traits (Liesz, 2001) 
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Both the theories were able to give some information about the optimal capital structure but none of 
theory provides a complete and sufficient answer to the optimal capital structure model. Both the 
theories have to supplement each other in order to provide a more precise answer to the capital 
structure puzzle. There are more theories available which helps in explaining the capital structure 
puzzle with some new and discussed elements. 
2.4 Agency Cost Model 
According to the Agency Cost Theory, the optimal capital structure can be achieved by minimising 
the cost arising from the conflicts between the parties involved. The basics for the theory was laid by 
Fama and Miller (1972) which was later on developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). According to 
the agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Jensen (1986) argued that the debt is not just included in the capital structure because of the tax-
benefits associated with debt but also included because debt reduces the problem of agency cost 
between the shareholders and managers. According to the Jensen and Meckling (1976) the incentive 
problems arises because of partition of the people who owns and control the firm and they found two 
major type of conflict that arises within agency cost, between shareholders and managers and between 
debt holders and shareholders. 
2.4.1 Conflict between Shareholders and Managers 
Payouts to shareholders reduce the resources under managers
 FRQWURO WKHUHE\ UHGXFLQJ PDQDJHU¶V
power, and making it more likely they will incur the monitoring of the capital markets which occurs 
when the firm must obtain new capital (Jensen, 1986). According to Jensen (1986), Managers prefer 
their firms to grow beyond the optimal size as the increase in the size increases their control. In 
addition, PDQDJHU¶VFRPSHQVDWLRQ is directly related to the growth of the firm sales. The managers 
usually receive remuneration instead of part of profits, and so managers prefer to get high benefits but 
that reducing the profits. Increasing debt commits the firm to pay out cash. Therefore, it reduces the 
amount of free cash flow available to the managers and the opportunities of such profligacy and 
empire building (Jensen, 1986). With increase in the debt in capital structure and keeping the 
PDQDJHU¶V LQYHVWPHQWFRQVWDQWXVXDOO\ LQFUHDVHV WKHPDQDJHU¶V VKDUH of equity and lessens the loss 
arising out of the conflict between the mangers and shareholders (Datta & Agarwal, 2009). As there is 
always a problem of diverge interests of managers and shareholders there are potential forces which 
will help to reduce the problem of diverge interests such as making senior management as stock 
holders (Jensen, 1986); dependency on outside management; including the performance of managers 
while paying them (Byrd, Parrino, & Pritsch, 1998). These measures are not a perfect solution and 
even after these forces, managers overlook these forces and work toward achieving their interest. 
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2.4.2 Conflict between Shareholders and Debt Holders 
This conflict arises due to the risk of default, as when the shareholders can gain at the cost of the debt 
holders. This case arises when the managers act in favour of the shareholders and the risk of default is 
significant to the firm. The manager got certain ways through which they can favour the shareholders. 
The manger can increase borrowing and payout cash to stockholders that will result in constant value 
for firm but decline in value of debt and manager may conceal the problem from the credit holder and 
hence preventing them to force bankruptcy, this lead the maturity of the debt to increase and make the 
debt more riskier (Myers S. C., 2001). The reason behind the conflict between the shareholders and 
debt holders is because of the difference in the risk appetite and the expected return. Debt holders are 
concerned about the current profit as it will ensure their return whereas equity shareholders might be 
willing to forgo the current profit for long-term capital appreciation. As a result, equity shareholders 
could invest even in risky projects with long gestation periods, which mark the interest of debt holders 
(Datta & Agarwal, 2009). 
Therefore, the consequences of including the debt have two-sided effect. The agency cost arising due 
to conflict between the manager and shareholders reduces with the inclusion of debt in the capital 
structure and the cost from the conflict of shareholders and debt holder increases with the increase in 
debt. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the optimal capital structure could be achieved with 
the trade-off between these agency costs and they also said that the agency cost model predicted a 
negative association of leverage with growth opportunities. 
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Chapter 3: Empirical Studies & The Theoretical Determinants of 
Capital Structure 
In the previous chapter, we have discussed the influential theories regarding the optimal capital 
structure. The earlier research done by the scholars usually placed more emphasis on countries like 
US and other developed economies regarding the firm based characteristics such as bankruptcy cost, 
taxation and asymmetric information. There are many variables that has been tested by various 
researchers and scholars to test empirical validity of capital structure. To get a fair idea the 
determinants are explained briefly in the section below. 
3.1 Profitability 
Profitability could be defined as earning power of the firm. We can say profitability as the ratio of 
earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation to total assets of the firm. The ILUP¶V profitability is a 
matter of great importance to get an optimum capital structure. Under the Pecking Order Theory, 
Myers (1984) cited evidence from Donaldson (1961) that the firm raises capital in a preferred 
VHTXHQFH7KHILUP¶VILUVWFKRLFHRISUHIHUHQFHLVLQWHUQDOIXQGLQJDQGRQO\ZKHQLQWHUQDOIXQGLQJLV
not sufficient then the firm opt for debt rather than issuing more equity. And for the Trade-Off Theory 
the firms gets advantage of including debt in the capital structure to avail the debt tax-shield but in 
order to claim the advantage of the tax shield, firm need to be  in profit. Therefore, the past 
profitability of the firm is an important determinant for the current capital structure of the firm. The 
theories suggests that a very low profitable firm with a slow growth rate will use less level of leverage 
than the firms in the same industry will rely heavily on debt financing than the other firms in the same 
industry (Ozkan, 2001). The Pecking Order Theory creates a negative relationship between the 
leverage level and the profits of the firm. Therefore, according to the theory a negative relationship 
should hold between debt and profitability. Toy et al. (1974), Kester (1986), Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and 
Ozkan (2001) all found an inverse relationship between level of gearing and profitability. 
The result of the Trade-Off Theory provides contrary result to the Pecking Order Theory. The Trade-
Off Theory of capital structure suggests that profitable firms would prefer to opt for more debt which 
would be needed to shield the larger profits generated from corporate taxes. This establishes a linear 
relation of gearing ratio and profitability. So higher the profitability of the firm, higher the level of 
debt in the capital structure of the firm. 
3.2 Firm Size 
)LUPVL]H LVRQHRIWKHPRVWFRPPRQGHWHUPLQDQWVZKLOHH[SODLQLQJ WKHFRPSDQ\¶VGHEWOHYHO7KH
firm size and leverage provides very astonishing results. There is literature present which states that 
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there is no conclusive relation between leverage and firm size. The research that there is no systematic 
relationship exist between leverage and the size of the firm is backed by Ferri and Jones (1979), Kim 
and Sorensen (1986) and Chung (1993). The study conducted by Ferri and Jones (1979) provided 
some relation between the leverage and firm size but the results was not able to explain the relation 
properly and the study by Chung (1993) found negligible relationship between the firm size and the 
use of debt in the capital structure. There have been various measured used by various researchers and 
scholars to calculate the firm size: logarithm of sales (Titman & Wessels, 1988) (Rajan & Zingales, 
1995), logarithm of total assets (Chen J. J., 2003). 
The Trade-Off Theory states a positive relationship between the size of the firm and the debt level in 
the capital structure. This implies that larger firm will be more dependent on the debt as compared to 
the small firms. Bankruptcy cost is deemed to be the most obvious reason behind the positive relation 
between debt and size of the firm as it is strongly related to the firm size. Bankruptcy cost usually has 
JUHDWHU SURSRUWLRQ LQ WKH ILUP¶V YDOXH DV WKDW YDlue decreases because of the economies of scales 
present in the bankruptcy cost (Warner, 1977). Later Titman and Wessels (1988) supported this 
statement by providing proof that the large firms are usually more diversified and are much safer as 
compared to smaller firm in respect of bankruptcy cost. Large firms may be able to exploit economies 
of scale in issuing securities (Chen & Strange, 2005). It is backed up by other Marsh (1982) that large 
firms have a bargaining power over their capital supplier, they issue debt instead of equity, and hence 
the larger firms have higher level of debt in their capital structure borrowed at rates that are more 
feasible. There been evidences that large firms have certain advantages when compared with the 
smaller firm. The large firms tends to have less agency costs, stable cash flows, easy access to credit 
market and they engage in high debt financing practices to increase the advantage of debt tax shield 
(Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto, 2004) 
However, the other important theory of capital structure i.e. Pecking Order Theory suggest negative 
relation between firm size and the leverage of the firm. It was stated by Gupta (1969) that the cost of 
acquiring equity financing is quite high for smaller firms and the management is more reluctant in 
opting for new equity capital because of the psychological reasons such as losing control. This led the 
small firms to rely on debt for most of the financing issues. Thus it is expected that smaller firms may 
have more debt in their capital structure as compared to the larger firms as acquiring equity for 
finance is an expensive option, the smaller firms may prefer short-term debt instead of long-term debt 
as fixed cost associated with the short-term debt is less. Rajan and Zingales (1995) also mentioned 
negative relation between leverage and debt level. Bates (1971) stated that small firms prefer internal 
financing rather than raising money via equity or debt because both the sources are more expensive 
for small firms and the statement was supported by Voulgaris, Asteriou & Agiomirgianakis (2004). 
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3.3 Growth Opportunities 
The empirical HYLGHQFHV DYDLODEOH IRU WKH UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ WKHJURZWKRSSRUWXQLWLHV DQG ILUP¶V
leverage level provide a mixed result. Titman and Wessels (1988) found negative relationship 
between the leverage and the growth opportunities available to the firm and Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) also found the same result for the gearing ratio and growth opportunities for the G7 countries 
and similar results were found by Gul (1999) while studying the growth opportunities and capital 
structure of the Japanese firms. However, Kester (1986) found no evidence that can support the 
negative relation. There were contradicting results found by Chen (2003), the results showed a 
positive relation of firms leverage and growth opportunities while studying the data of Chinese firms 
which was consistent with other developed economies expect for US. Growth opportunities has been 
GHILQHGE\7LWPDQDQG:HVVHOVDV³JURZWKRSSRUWXQLWLHVDUHFDSLWDODVVHWVWKDWDGGYDOXHWRD
firm but cannot be collateralized and do not generate current WD[DEOHLQFRPH´ 
The agency cost is deemed to be one of the important determinants of leverage (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976)³7KHFRVWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKLVDJHQF\UHODWLRQVKLSLVOLNHO\WREHKLJKHUIRUILUPVLQJURZLQJ
industries, which have more flexibility in their choice of future investments. Expected future growth 
should thus be negatively related to long-WHUPGHEWOHYHOV´ (Titman & Wessels, 1988). The problem 
could show opposite results if the firm switch the use of long-term debt to short-term debt (Myers S. 
C., 1977). 
The Trade-Off Theory provides with a different results while taking growth opportunities and gearing 
ratio in mind. According to the Trade-Off Theory, the firms prefer to utilise less debt as it increases 
the expected cost of bankruptcy for the firm. Firms with higher ratio of tangible assets are more 
comfortable in borrowing rather than the firm holding more of intangible assets because intangible 
assets cannot be used as collateralization for the growth opportunities. According to Myers (1984), 
specialised intangible assets or growth opportunities are the first few things that lose their value in the 
time of financial distress. 
On the other hand the Pecking Order Theory gives us a positive relation between the gearing ratio and 
growth opportunities as the firm with growth opportunities will require huge amount of funds and 
LQWHUQDOILQDQFLQJZRQ¶WDEOHWRSURYLGHVXIILFLHQWIXQGLQJIRUWKHfirm. In addition, according to the 
Pecking Order Theory when external financing is required firm will opt for debt first and then only 
will shift to equity (Frank & Goyal, 2003). 
There have been various measurements used by various researchers ZKLOH PHDVXULQJ WKH ILUP¶V
growth opportunities. Some of the widely used measurements are: market-to-book ratio of total assets 
(Myers S. C., 1977), (Ozkan, 2001); annual growth UDWHRIILUP¶VDVVHWV (Titman & Wessels, 1988), 
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(Chen J. J., 2003); Kester (1986) used an exceptional measure which is the average of net debt 
divided by market value of equity. 
3.4 Asset Tangibility 
Tangibility has been defined as the ratio of fixed assets to the total assets by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Titman and Wessels (1988). The Pecking Order Theory and the Trade-Off Theory both 
states that the asset composition of the firm has role in shaping up the capital structure of the firm. 
The Trade-Off Theory states a positive relation between tangibility of assets and leverage of a firm 
because of the simple reason that the fixed assets can be utilised as collateral for debt financing. The 
use of tangible assets as collateral to reduce the risk of lender from suffering the agency cost of debt 
and the tangible assets hold more value at the time of liquidation and thus the greater the value of 
fixed assets helps the company to gain access to debt easily (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Scott (1977) 
suggested that firms that are not able to provide collateral for the debt financing usually forced to 
issue equity or pay higher interest rates. Therefore, companies with higher level of tangible assets get 
the debt easily. Thus, a positive relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage is anticipated 
which is confirmed by various scholars Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Marsh (1982).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) argued that the firms with high amount of debt in their 
capital structure tends to under invest or invest optimally and hence transferring the wealth from debt 
holders to equity holders. And the lenders usually ask for collateral to make their position safe as 
providing with secure debt can lighten this problem. 
Under the Pecking Order Theory it is stated that firm with high level of tangible assets have less 
asymmetrical information, and hence prefer equity financing (Harris & Raviv, 1991). Researchers like 
Harris and Raviv (1991) and Frank and Goyal (2003) stated that firm with low level of tangible assets 
prefer to acquire as much debt as possible and become highly levered and if adverse selection is about 
assets in place, tangibility would increase adverse selection and results in higher debt (Frank & Goyal, 
2003). 
Results of most of the studies conducting about testing relationship between tangibility of assets and 
leverage of firm showed positive relation between both of them. There are different measures of 
tangibility taken by different researchers, the ratio of fixed to total assets by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Chung (1993) and the ratio of total net amount of fixed assets (cost of fixed assets minus 
accumulated depreciation)  by total assets by Shah and Khan (2007). 
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3.5 Non-Debt Tax Shields 
The proxy of non-debt tax shields can be measured by total annual depreciation charges and 
investment tax credits on the sum of annual earnings (Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim, 1984), ratio of annual 
depreciation to total assets (Titman & Wessels, 1988), (Chen J. J., 2003). 
With the non-debt tax shield the main theories of capital structure agrees in the same notion. Both, the 
Pecking Order Theory and the Trade-Off Theory implies that it is inversely related to the leverage of 
the firm. This indicates that firm with higher advantage of non-debt tax shield will prefer to use less 
debt in their capital structure (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980), (Myers S. C., 1984), (Myers & Majluf, 
1984). Ozkan (2001) and Modigliani and Miller (1963) argued that with other tax shields available to 
the firm such as depreciation and investment tax credit deductions, the value of debt-tax shields 
reduces and the firm is not very keen in raising debt for the advantage of debt-tax shield. The Trade-
Off Theory suggests that one of the main motivations behind including debt in the capital structure is 
saving corporate tax. According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggested that the marginal value of 
tax-debt shield reduces with every unit of debt added, and with the presence of non-debt tax shield, 
the debt turns out to be more expensive. Overall, the higher the level of non-debt tax shield reduces 
the potential tax benefit attached with the introduction of debt in the capital structure. There only very 
few studies which shows the contradicting relation between the leverage and non-debt tax shield. 
Most of the empirical evidences show a negative relation between non-debt shield and leverage but 
Bradley, Jarrell & Kim (1984) researched showed a positve realtion between these two. 
3.6 Volatility 
Earning volatility is a proxy for the probability of financial distress and it is generally expected to be 
negatively related with leverage (Huang & Song, 2006). The volatility of earnings is defined as the 
absolute difference between the annual percentage change in earnings before interest and taxes and 
the average of this change over the sample period (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto, 2004). Various 
other author explained volatility differently. ³Several measures of volatility are used in empirical 
studies, such as the standard deviation of the return on sales (Booth, Aivazian, Kunt, & Vojislav, 
2001), standard deviation of the first difference in operating cash flow scaled by total assets e.g., 
(Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim, 1984), (Chaplinsky & Niehaus, 1993), (Wald, 1999) or standard deviation of 
the percentage change in operating income e.g., (Titman & Wessels, 1988).´ (Huang & Song, 2006). 
Higher volatility of earnings increases the probability of financial distress, since firms may not be able 
WR IXOILO WKHLU GHEW VHUYLFLQJ FRPPLWPHQWV 7KXV ILUP¶V GHEW FDSDFLW\ GHFUHDVHV ZLWK LQFUHDVHV LQ
earnings volatility leading to an expected inverse relation with leverage (Deesomsak, Paudyal, & 
Pescetto, 2004). However, Modigliani±Miller theorems state WKDW YDULDQFH RI ILUP¶V DVVHW LQFUHDVHV
then the systematic risk of equity starts to decline. Hence, the risk is positively related to leverage. 
According to the Trade-Off Theory, large earning volatility leads to an increase probability of 
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financial distress and hence making it difficult for the firms to acquire more financing via means of 
debt. 
3.7 Industries Classification 
The firm within a particular industry group have different impact on the leverage capacity of the firm.  
Each industry has its unique and distinguished characteristics which have its impact on shaping up the 
capital structure. Usually the firm that comes under the same industry within the same country usually 
displays similar characteristics like the utility industry comes under highly levered industry and high 
technological industry comes under low-levered industry. 
The impact of a particular industry was studied by Bradley et al. (1984) conducted a research to 
investigate the cross-sectional behaviour for 851 firms across 25 industries to examine the 20 year 
DYHUDJH RI ILUP¶V OHYHUDJH UDWLR The evidence from the study suggested that industry factor has a 
strong influence on the leverage ratio of the sample firms. Harris and Raviv (1991) supported the 
same evidence in their research. The list of the companies used in the research is given in Appendix 1 
with the respective industry classification. 
The studies conducted by various scholars like Bradley et al. (1984) and Kester (1986) mainly divided 
industries producing drugs, instruments, electronics and food into low levered industries and 
industries producing paper, textiles, steel, airlines as highly levered industries. 
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So the above-mentioned variables are used for this research and a summary of various studies related 
to the above variables is presented below: 
Determinants 
Expected 
Theoretical 
Relation 
Supporting 
Theory Empirical Evidences 
Profitability 
Negative Pecking Order Theory 
Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999);  
Griner and 
Gordon (1995); Kester (1986). 
Positive Trade-Off Theory 
Dammon and 
Senbet (1988). 
Size 
Negative Pecking Order Theory 
Kester (1986); Titman and Wessels 
(1988). 
Positive Trade-Off Theory 
Marsh (1982); Rajan and Zingales 
(1995); Warner (1977). 
Growth 
Opportunities 
Negative Trade-Off Theory Myers (1984). 
Positive Pecking Order Theory 
Titman and Wessels (1988); Frank and 
Goyal (2003). 
Asset 
Tangibility Positive 
Pecking Order 
Theory, Trade-
Off 
Theory 
Chung 
(1993); Harris and Raviv (1991). 
Non-Debt Tax 
Shields Negative Trade-Off Theory Wald (1999). 
Volatility Negative Trade-Off Theory Bradley et al. (1984); Huang & Song (2006). 
Table 3.1: Impact of various determinants on gearing ratio of firm presented with empirical evidences 
and related theories (Chen J. J., 2003). 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Data Description 
In the previous chapters, we have discussed the literature available on capital structure and various 
previous empirical evidences, the theoretical determinants of the capital structure. Now this chapter 
will introduce the methodology and the data collection used for our empirical study to investigate the 
determinants and factors that affect the capital structure decision making of a firm. 
4.1 Data Collection 
The data for the researcher is collected from DATASTREAM which offers information about the 
balance sheets and income statements for all the listed firms. The detailed list of all the companies 
listed under FTSE 350 on London Stock Exchange index is mentioned and data for the 10 years that is 
from 2002 to 2011 is collected for this research. 
The research does not include all the companies listed in FTSE 350 Index on London Stock 
Exchange. Not all the firms are suitable for this research and to provide a better and more reliable 
result the data required sampling. Therefore, the suitable sampling is done for the data based on the 
following criteria. Firstly, the firms that are selected for the sample should not belong to the category 
of financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies, real investments companies and stock 
agents as their financial structure is quite different from non-financial companies (Chen J. J., 2003). In 
addition, the firms whose data was not fully available on the database is also excluded to make 
balanced panel dataset. 
An ideal study would include all the data available on the companies listed on FTSE 350 on London 
Stock Exchange for a long period of time but because of the constraints of time and data availability, 
178 companies has been selected from different industries for a period of 10 years from 2002 to 2011. 
4.2 Description of Variables 
After going through so many empirical and theoretical reviews, there are various definitions available 
for the gearing ratio and the determinants of capital structure. For this study, we will analyse two 
different dependent variables, which are long-term leverage and short-term leverage. All the 
independent variables regarding this research has been taken from the literature mentioned above and 
after considering work of various scholars on the determinants of capital structure, the independent 
variables used in this research are profitability, firm size, growth opportunities, asset tangibility, non-
GHEWWD[VKLHOGVDQGILUP¶VYRODWLOLW\ 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The research question mainly focuses on the determinants and factors affecting the firms borrowing 
pattern, for this the debt-equity ratio or the gearing ratio is the preferred dependent variables. There 
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been various measures to calculate the gearing ratio by various researchers in the past. While finding 
out the impact of various determinants on the gearing ratio we first have to distinguish between the 
market value and book value. There is been research done by various researchers to show the contrast 
between the market value and book value results. Even after so many years of research there is been 
debate about which values should be used as a proxy of leverage, whether we should use market 
values or the book values. Bowman (1980) argued that using book values in place for market value 
will have effect on the research although the effect will be small. 
There is been various views on using book value and market value while observing capital structure. 
Frank and Goyal (2008) stated that book value of debt is backward looking and only measures what 
has already taken place in the firms and market value of debt is a forward-looking approach. Myers 
(1984) said that book value is just a measure that reflects the assets of the firms whereas market value 
reflects assets of the firm along with intangibles, growth opportunities present to the firm. There is 
been various researchers and scholars (e.g. Rosenberg and McKibben (1973)) who prefers market 
value of debt over the book value of debt wherever it is possible for them to include in their empirical 
studies. 
On the other hand, there are scholars who justify the use of book value of debt as a proxy for leverage. 
Bowman (1980), Marsh (1982), Titman and Wessels (1988) suggested and showed that the cross-
sectional correlation between the market value and book value is very large and the misspecification 
arises due to the use of book value in place of market value will be quite small. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that there should not be any major bias if book value of debt is used instead of market 
value of debt. According the research conducted it was found that the 83% of the respondents use 
book values to measure debt to equity ratio rather than the theoretically-supported market values 
which is used by 12% and the result also showed that 5% use both of the values (Beattie, Goodacre, & 
Thomson, 2006). And due data constraints and keeping in mind the various arguments presented by 
various scholars, this paper will measure debt in terms of book values instead of market values. 
For the definition of leverage there are a lot of views present by various scholars. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) gave one of the broadest definitions for leverage. According to them leverage is the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets. However, it is known that when the firm raises capital, it considers 
various kind of debt option available to the firm. Hence, the different kind of debt available should be 
differentiated based on its maturity as long-term debt and short-term debt. There are many empirical 
evidences that suggest that the long-term and short-term debt has different effect on the financial 
decisions of the firm. Even the cost related to acquiring long-term debt and short-term debt is 
different. Therefore, it is important to know the different type of debt available to a firm based on 
maturity. Therefore, for this study we have used both short-term debt and long-term debt to be the 
dependent variables in the model. 
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Long-Term Leverage: Long-term leverage is defined as the ratio of long term debt to total assets of 
the firm. Long-term debt includes all the debt instruments that are payable in a period more than a 
year. 
Short-Term Leverage: Short-term leverage is defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total assets of 
the firm. Short-term debt include all the debt instruments that are payable within a period of one year. 
The following table presents the formula used to calculate the long-term and short-term leverage: 
     Dependent Variable                          Measurement 
Long-Term Leverage (LTLEV) LTLEV = Total Long-Term Debt/Total Assets 
Short-Term Leverage (STLEV) STLEV = Total Short-Term Debt/Total Assets 
         Table 4.1: Measurement used for the dependent variable 
4.2.2 Independent Variable 
After comparing the empirical research conducted by various researchers, we have taken certain 
measures used to calculate the independent variables used for this research. We have used 
profitability, firm size, growth opportunities, asset tangibility m non-debt tax shield and volatility to 
test the prediction of trade-off, pecking order and agency theory. 
Profitability: Profitability is calculated by pre-tax profits (EBITD) to total assets. The same measure 
is used by many researchers (e.g. Bevan and Danbolt (2004); Ozkan (2001)) in their research 
conducted. 
۾܀۽ ൌ ۾ܚܗ܎ܑܜ۰܍܎ܗܚ܍܂܉ܠ܉ܖ܌۲܍ܘܚ܍܋ܑ܉ܜܑܗܖ܂ܗܜ܉ܔۯܛܛ܍ܜܛ  
Firm Size: Firm size is represented by the logarithm of total assets, the log smoothens the variation in 
the figure over the period of time (Shah & Khan, 2007). ܁۷܈ ൌ ۺܖሺۼ܍ܜ܁܉ܔ܍ܛሻ 
Growth Opportunities: Growth opportunity is measured by the percentage change in the total assets 
of firms during the period selected. The same measure is used by the study conducted by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995). 
۵܀۽ ൌ ܂ܗܜ܉ܔۯܛܛ܍ܜܛܜ െ ܂ܗܜ܉ܔۯܛܛ܍ܜܛܜି૚܂ܗܜ܉ܔۯܛܛ܍ܜܛܜି૚  
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Asset Tangibility: This is calculated by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (Titman & Wessels, 
1988), (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). 
܂ۯۼ ൌ ۴ܑܠ܍܌ۯܛܛ܍ܜܛ܂ܗܜ܉ܔۯܛܛ܍ܜܛ 
Non-Debt Tax Shield: This is measured as a ratio of annual depreciation divided by total assets 
(Chen J. J., 2003), (Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim, 1984). 
ۼ۲܂܁ ൌ ۲܍ܘܚ܍܋ܑ܉ܜܑܗܖ܂ܗܜ܉ܔۯܛܛ܍ܜܛ  
Earnings Volatility: Earnings volatility is defined as the absolute value of the first difference of the 
growth rate of operating income (Chen J. J., 2003). 
܄۽ۺ ൌ ฬ۳۰۷܂ܜ െ ۳۰۷܂ܜି૚۳۰۷܂ܜି૚ െ ۳۰۷܂ܜି૚ െ ۳۰۷܂ܜି૛۳۰۷܂ܜି૛ ฬ 
Industry Classification: Industries are classified using the dummy variables. The firm within a 
specific group industry (9 industries, Appendix 2) is given as one and other being zero to know the 
impact on gearing ratio. 
4.3 Research Model 
For this study, we have used quantitative methods over the qualitative methods. In the following part, 
we are using the static model to investigate the impact of various independent variables chosen on the 
short-term leverage and long-term leverage of the firm. We have used ANOVA and panel analysis 
models with the help of the statistical software named STATA 11. 
4.3.1 ANOVA for Industry Classification 
We have used dummy variables in our model named industry classification. We have used One Way 
ANOVA to examine the effect how the industry classification has effect on the firms short-term and 
long-term leverage. 
The main purpose of conducting the ANOVA test is know whether the difference between sample is 
because of random errors or whether there was a systematic treatment difference which led the score 
of one group different than the other group. In our research, we are conducting the analysis of 
variance to check the impact of industrial classification on the leverage through comparing the 
variance among the different groups which is due to independent variable with the variability within 
each of the groups which is due to chance. In the recent years, many scholars have included dummy 
variables for industry and using regression for the industry dummies against the leverage. Ozkan 
(2001) said that firm belongs to certain industry enjoys the conditions like entry barriers, and factor 
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market conditions. We will test the industry effect by regressing industry dummy variable against the 
long-term and short-term leverage. The model for the same is given below: ܵܶܮܧܸ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௜ܫܰܦ௜ ൅݁ଵ 
ܮܶܮܧܸ ൌ ߙ ൅෍ߚ௜ܫܰܦ௜ ൅݁ଵ 
Here STLEV is short-term leverage and LTLEV is long-term leverage, Į is the constant number which 
indicates the interception for the regression line. INDi is the industry specific dummy used to 
represent the industry classification. And ȕi is the coefficient what our regression model will derive, 
representing the variation to leverage of different industries. 
4.3.2 Panel Analysis for Trade-Off Theory, Pecking Order Theory and Agency Cost 
In the previous studies, we have seen use of OLS regression on cross-sectional data and in the recent 
papers, the scholars took the advantage of improved technology and used panel data regression, which 
involves both cross-sectional and time-series observations. 
Panel data is pooling observations of cross-sectional over a period of time. To be more precise the 
panel data is more effective than either cross-sectional data or time-series data alone as it has the 
features of both the data sets to analyse the capital structure of the firms. We are using panel 
regression to show the relationship between the long-term and short-term leverage against the various 
determinants (size, profitability, non-debt tax shield, asset tangibility, earning volatility, growth 
opportunities). 
There are various researchers which have used panel data for their research such as Ozkan (2001), 
Bevan and Danbolt (2004), Chen (2003) because the panel data has various advantages over the cross-
sectional and time-series research methods. The panel data has a large amount of data points, which 
increases the degree of freedom, and hence it reduces the co-linearity between the explanatory 
variables which overall improves the overall results (Hsiao, 2003). 
In order to explain the determinant RI8.ILUPV¶leverage ratio, a standard regression approach which 
is followed in most of the existing empirical literature is applied in our study has shown below: ܵܶܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܴܱܲ ൅ ߚଶܵܫܼ ൅ ߚଷܩܴܱ ൅ ߚସܶܣܰ ൅ ߚହܰܦܶܵ ൅ ߚ଺ܸܱܮ ൅ ߝ௜௧ ܮܶܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܴܱܲ ൅ ߚଶܵܫܼ ൅ ߚଷܩܴܱ ൅ ߚସܶܣܰ ൅ ߚହܰܦܶܵ ൅ ߚ଺ܸܱܮ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
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Where ݅ UHSUHVHQWVWKHLQGLYLGXDOILUPLQRXUFDVH«« ݐ represents the time period, in our case 2002-2011. ߝ represents the error term. ߚ௜ represents the coefficient of the independent variables. 
7KHGHSHQGHQWDQG LQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHVDUH WKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRI ILUP¶VFDSLWDO VWUXFWXUHZKLFKDUH
explained in the above chapter. 
The null and alternative hypotheses for this model are: ܪ଴ǣ ߚଵ ൌ ߚଶ ൌ ߚଷ ൌ ߚସ ൌ ߚହ ൌ ߚ଺ 
That is, none RIWKHH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVFRXOGH[SODLQ8.ILUPV¶FDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHGHFLVLRQV ܪଵǣ ߚଵǡ ߚଶǡ ߚଷǡ ߚସǡ ߚହǡ ߚ଺ ്  ? 
7KDWLVDWOHDVWRQHRIWKHLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHVDFFRXQWVIRU8.ILUPV¶ERUURZLQJSROLFLHV 
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results and Analysis 
In this chapter we will provide the statistical results and analyse the outputs of the test conducted 
(ANOVA, Panel Data Model and Pooled OLS) to know about which determinants effects the capital 
structure decision and how these determinants affects the capital structure. The findings of the above 
tests are interpreted, evaluated and compared to the theoretical predictions and previous empirical 
studies. 
5.1 Multicollinearity 
Before running the regression analysis, we need to check that our data is free from multicollinearity. 
Collinearity exists when two variables have a significant relationship irrespective of the sign. 
Multicollinearity exists when there are more than two variables involved. For the check of 
multicollinearity, we have used correlation matrix and VIF (Variance Inflating Factor). There are 
various problems involved with multicollinearity (a) P value can be high, even though the variable is 
important; (b) confidence intervals on the regression coefficients will be very wide which will lead to 
DFFHSWWKH³]HURQXOOK\SRWKHVLV´PRUHUHDGLO\, etc. (Farrar & Glauber, 1967). The correlation matrix 
is shown on the next below: 
  
Table 5.1: Correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables                                                       
Multicollinearity exist when there is a strong correlation of .70 or higher between two variables. We 
can say that a correlation of .1 to .29 can be categorized in low correlation, .30 to .49 to be medium 
and .5 to 1 as high correlation. The signs do not have any impact on the correlation, it only indicates 
about the direction of the relationship. In our results, we can say that all the results lies between low to 
medium range of correlation. The Table 5.1 shows a negative relation of short-term leverage and a 
positive relation with long-term leverage with the tangibility. The results are mixed and not all results 
are constant with the empirical evidences. Both of the dependent variables have a negative relation 
with volatility although which is consistent with the empirical evidences. There is a different result for 
         SIZ     0.0507  -0.0193   0.0535  -0.0734  -0.0901  -0.0687  -0.0581   1.0000
         PRO     0.0214   0.0041   0.1292  -0.0695   0.0654   0.2284   1.0000
        NDTS     0.0196   0.2037   0.4975   0.0060  -0.1505   1.0000
         GRO     0.0190  -0.0412  -0.0575   0.0296   1.0000
         VOL    -0.0032  -0.0020  -0.0312   1.0000
         TAN    -0.0019   0.3120   1.0000
       LTLEV    -0.0855   1.0000
       STLEV     1.0000
                                                                                      
                  STLEV    LTLEV      TAN      VOL      GRO     NDTS      PRO      SIZ
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growth regarding the short-term leverage and long-term leverage, and the Trade-Off Theory states a 
negative result. The result of profitability and non-debt tax shield both have a positive relation with 
short-term and long-term leverage. And again the size of the firm also shows a mixed result. It 
exhibits a low positive correlation with short-term leverage and a low negative with long-term 
leverage. In general, the correlation matrix does not prove to be consistent. However, it indicates low 
chance of multicollinearity due to the low correlation values for most of the variables.  Now we use 
the alternative method that is VIF, which states that if the result, is less than 10 then it is not collinear. 
                       
          Table 5.2: Variance Inflating Factor 
And from the Table 5.2 we can see that non of our value is above 10 hence provoing that the data 
GRHVQ¶WKDYHPXOWLFROOLQHDULW\DPRQJLWVYDULDEOHV 
5.2 Statistical Description 
The statistical description is done according to the table presented in Appendix 3. The results of that 
table shows a variance in the observations, the variance occurs in the number of observations due to 
the unavailability of data for certain dependent and independent variables. The mean of short-term 
leverage is 5.1% whereas for the long-term leverage is 21.60%.the results are quite similar to the 
empirical studies done earlier regarding the capital structure of UK based firms. The variance in the 
leverage ratios of this regarding the other studies can because of the different formulas used to 
calculate the leverage ratios by different scholars. The mean of asset tangibility is 31.05%. This shows 
the proportion of fixed assets to total assets of the companies. The growth opportunities have a mean 
of 19.45% with a minimum of -1% and max of 54%.The non-debt tax shields vary from a very low 
0.004% to 25.16% with a mean of 3.43%. Profitability has an average of 14.35%, which is a 
consistent feature of firms with large size and high maturity. The size of the firm is calculated using 
the Ln(Net Sales) so the result is realised with e13.86 which gives us the average net sales as 1.05 
million pounds. 
5.3 Regression Analysis 
The pDQHO GDWD UHJUHVVLRQ ZDV UXQ WR DQDO\VH WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH ILUP¶V OHYHUDJH DQG WKH
various determinants of capital structure which are firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, asset 
    Mean VIF        1.16
                                    
         GRO        1.01    0.987822
         VOL        1.02    0.984327
         PRO        1.02    0.976660
         SIZ        1.04    0.964936
         TAN        1.42    0.702075
        NDTS        1.45    0.688458
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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tangibility, non-debt tax shield and earning volatility. The above model used long-term leverage and 
short-term leverage as the dependent variables. 
5.3.1 Pooled OLS Results 
We use the pooled OLS test to get the results for the regression and deduce the relationship between 
various independent variables and the dependent variables. For the purpose of deducing relationship 
between two different dependent variables we have used the pooled OLS twice. The results for short-
term leverage and long-term leverage are presented in Table 5.3. 
                                   
    Table 5.3 Pooled OLS for Short-Term Leverage and Long-Term Leverage (refer Appendix 4 and 5) 
We can infer from the above table tangibility has mixed results regarding the short-term and long-
term leverage. Tangibility shows a negative relation with the short-term leverage whereas a positive 
relation with the long-term leverage. The results for volatility are not consistent with the empirical 
evidences available. Earning Volatility forms a positive relation with both the short and long-term 
leverage. The results of non-debt tax shield show a positive relation. And growth, size and 
profitability make a mixed relation with short and long-term leverage. This can be concluded as the 
Trade-Off Theory and Pecking Order Theory also gives different results for these three independent 
variables. We are getting the R2 value of 0.004 for the short-term leverage regression and the value of 
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.099 for long-term leverage regression. In theories, the R2 for the micro panel data is usually quite 
small and ranges from 0.10 to 0.25.  There are certain problems with the results of the pooled OLS 
results as pooled OLS is not free from certain disadvantages, pooled OLS known for not using the full 
richness of the panel data sample and it ignores the fLUP¶V heterogeneity. Because of the certain 
limitations, we will use the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Test to check for the heterogeneity in the 
sample. 
5.3.2 Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Test for Pooled Model & Random Model 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Test is used to detect the presence of heterogeneity in the sample data. As 
the difference between the coefficients of the pooled OLS and random effects tests there, we need 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Test to tell about which test results are better in the two. We will see from 
the Table 5.4 that the P-value of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Test for short-term leverage and long-
term leverage comes out to be less than 0.05, which means we reject the null hypothesis and we 
conclude that random effects model is better and significant than the pooled OLS regression method. 
The null and alternative hypothesis for the following is mentioned below: 
               H0: Pooled OLS Model is appropriate 
              H1: Random effects Model is appropriate 
                        
 
            P-values 
Short-Term Leverage Long-Term Leverage 
0.000 0.000 
                                 Table 5.4: Summary for Breusch-Pagan Test (refer Appendix 6 and 7) 
We can see the coefficients of the independent variables affecting the long-term and short-term 
leverage. From the Table 5.5 we can see that the results of the pooled OLS and random effects model 
have different results and the results also vary for the direction trend of the independent variable on 
the short-term and long-term leverage. We can see that the result for the tangibility regarding both the 
long-term and short- term leverage gives us almost the same coefficient with the same direction, but 
except for those the results of the random effects model varies in the magnitude as well as the 
direction. We can see that with the random effects model the coefficient values of the independent 
variables turns to have a negative relation with the short-term leverage. The non-debt tax shield shows 
a different result, it shows a negative relation with the long-term leverage instead of the short-term 
leverage. 
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Table 5.5: Random effects Model for Short-Term and Long-Term Leverage (refer Appendix 8 and 9) 
5.3.3 Hausman Test 
Hausman test is used to test the effect of fixed effects model against the random effects model. The 
random effects model pre-assumes that there is no correlation the group specific random effects and 
the regressors. But on the other hand this assumption is not so true and the fixed effects model does 
not make any assumption in regard of the correlation between the individual effects and the 
regressors. The Hausman test checks whether the assumption of the correlation is statistically present 
or not in the sample data. The null hypotheses for this test is that the group specific random effects 
and the regressors are not correlated and thus if the Hausman test shows a parameter value of more 
than 0.05 than it would mean that fixed effects model is inefficient and random effects model is better. 
The results of the Hausman test are given below in the table 5.6: 
                        
 
            P-values 
Short-Term Leverage Long-Term Leverage 
0.0024 0.0000 
                                 Table 5.6: Summary for Hausman Test (refer Appendix 10 and 11) 
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We can see from the results that the null hypothesis is rejected in our case and hence the fixed effects 
model is better than the random effects model as all the P-values for both of the dependent variable is 
less than 0.05. Our results for choosing the fixed effects model over the random effects model was 
also supported by the model presented by Bevan and Danbolt (2004), there model also favoured the 
fixed effects model over the random effects model due to the presence of correlation. 
5.3.4 Fixed Effects Model 
From the Hausman test, we deduce that the fixed effects model is the best model for getting the 
optimum regression results. The fixed effects model takes effect of correlation and heterogeneity, 
hence the results of this model tends to provide better results as compared pooled OLS model and the 
random effects model. 
We get two regression equations, one where the short-term leverage is the dependent variable and the 
other with long-term leverage as the dependent variable. The regression equation for short-term 
leverage as the dependent variable is as follows: ܵܶܮܧ ௜ܸ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?െ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ሻܴܲ ௜ܱ െ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ሻܵܫܼ௜ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ܩܴ ௜ܱ െ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ሻܶܣ ௜ܰ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ?ܰܦܶܵ௜ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ܸܱܮ௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
And the regression equation with long-term leverage as the dependent variable: ܮܶܮܧ ௜ܸ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?െ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሻܴܲ ௜ܱ െ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ሻܵܫܼ௜ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?ܩܴܱ௜ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ܶܣ ௜ܰെ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ?ሻܰܦܶ ௜ܵ ൅  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ܸܱܮ௜ ൅ ߝ௜ 
The table 5.7 gives us the coefficient values of the independent variable with respect to the dependent 
variable by using a fixed effects model. For the model, we have used 1618 observations for the short-
term leverage analysis and 1617 observations for the long-term leverage analysis. The result of the R2 
for the short-term leverage model is 0.0147 and for the long-term leverage model is 0.0185. The value 
of R2 is quite low from the usually accepted values but on the contrary, the F-Test values suggest that 
the model is the best fit as the P-Value of the F-Test is 0.0000. The reason behind low value of R2 can 
happen because of various unavoidable reasons. One of the most important reasons behind the low 
explanatory power that indicates the relationship between the variables is because of the difference in 
the technique to measure the selected variables or because of unobservable elements. In respect to this 
study, we have used the book values instead of the market values for measuring the variables.  Certain 
more elements are not included in our study that may lead to a lower value of R2 such as 
macroeconomics factors, uniqueness and liquidity. One of the other reasons for a low value of R2 is 
the exclusion of various companies due lack availability of data on the DataStream database. 
38 
 
 Table 5.7: Summary statistics for the fixed effects model (refer to Appendix 12 and 13)  
Now we need to evaluate each of the independent variable with respect to the two dependent variables 
chosen for this research. The independent variables need to be evaluated and analysed based on two 
criteria. First, we have to check whether the independent variable contributed toward change in the 
independent variable and secondly, the magnitude of the independent variable towards the dependent 
variable. The results of the six independent variables are now explained and the relation of these six 
variables with short-term leverage and long-term leverage derived though the fixed effect model is 
discussed in detail below. 
 
Profitability (PRO) 
Probability is one of the important variables which affect the leverage of the firm. Various studies 
have shown that profitability is one of the important determinants with respect to the capital structure 
decisions of the firm. In our result, we get the P-Value as 0.037, which makes the profitability 
significant at 95% confidence interval for the short-term leverage. The results are consistent with most 
of the empirical studies earlier done while solving up the Capital Structure Puzzle. Titman and 
Wessels (1988) argues that profitability is one of the most important factors while choosing the 
financing options by the management. The result of the P-Value for the long-term leverage is 0.000 
which is also gives us the same results. Bennett and Donnelly (1993) also conducted the research 
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using the cross sectional determinants of capital structure among the non-financial firms and their 
results also showed that profitability acts an important factor while determining the capital structure 
choice by the management. 
Our results for the coefficient showed a negative correlation between profitability and short-term 
leverage as well as with the long-term leverage. The result for the short-term leverage comes out to be 
(-0.0344) which implies that a single unit increase in the profitability will decrease the short-term 
leverage of UK firms by 0.0344 units. The results for the long-term showed that one unit increase in 
the profitability would reduce the long-term leverage level by 0.1287 units. The results are consistent 
with the Pecking order Theory which states that when that there is an order by which the firm will 
prefer to gather funds and in that list internal funding is the first preference of choice, hence if the 
firms have enough profits to support internal financing then firm wont prefer outside options for 
finance. The results are supported by various scholars and researchers such as Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Fama and French (1999), Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Ozkan (2001), all the researchers got 
an inverse relation of profitability with the gearing ratio of the firm. But our results contradict the 
results of the Agency Theory as well for the Trade-Off Theory. 
So overall our statistical results are very much satisfactory as they are consistent with most of the 
empirical studies conducted prior in the same field of research. 
 
Firm Size (SIZ) 
Coefficient of firm size is (-0.0096) on short-term leverage of the firm with P-Value as 0.003. This 
gives a significant negative relation between firm size and the short-term leverage. The results are 
consistent with the Pecking Order Theory but on the other hand our results contradicts the results of 
the Agency Cost and Trade-Off Theory which states the bigger the size of the firm the more safer it is 
from the bankruptcy cost and hence these firms include more of debt into their capital structure. On 
the other hand we do not find significant result for the long-term leverage and the firm size as the P-
Value comes out to be 0.171 with the coefficient as (-0.0084). 
Overall, we got mixed results for the firm size. The effect of the firm size has a significant negative 
effect on short-term leverage, which is consistent with most of the capital structure theories. There 
been similar results produced in the studies of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Gupta (1969), Bates (1971) 
and Voulgaris, Asteriou & Agiomirgianakis (2004). All these scholars suggested that smaller firms 
prefer to finance internally rather than choosing the debt financing. On the other hand the results for 
the long-term leverage gave us insignificant results which are consistent with the researches of Ferri 
and Jones (1979), Kim and Sorensen (1986) and Chung (1993). The research conducted by all the 
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researchers does not prove any direct and significant impact of the firm size on the leverage level of 
the firm. Overall the results regarding the firm size and the leverage cannot be fully accepted or 
declined as the results shows significance while using it against the short-term leverage and 
insignificant while regressing against the long-term leverage. 
 
Asset Tangibility (TAN) 
The result estimates do not reveal any significant relationship between asset tangibility and debt level. 
The P-Values for both long-term leverage and short-term leverage comes out to be quite high, 0.377 
and 0.471 respectively for short-term leverage and long-term leverage. This means that the asset 
tangibility does not have enough explanatory power on the capital structure decisions of the UK based 
companies selected in this test. The high P-Value means that our results are not statistically significant 
but the results could be theoretically significant. The coefficient for short-term leverage comes out to 
be (-0.0195) which is not consistent with most of the previous empirical evidences present regarding 
the asset tangibility and debt ratio except for a few conducted scholars such as Bevan & Danbolt 
(2002). The reason behind a negative relation between short-term leverage and asset tangibility may 
be due to the reason that selling an asset in short period of time is not an easy task for the debt 
holders. But on the other hand the result for the long-term leverage gives a positive relation between 
these two. The coefficient for the long-term leverage is 0.0302 which is consistent with both the 
Pecking Order Theory as well as the Trading-Off Theory. Both of these theories suggested that the 
firm with tangible assets could use them to collateralise for the debt and issuing debt that is secured 
by tangible assets reduces the agency cost. The results long-term leverage and short-term leverage is 
consistent with the work of scholars like Rajan and Zingales (1995), Chen (2003) and Bevan & 
Danbolt (2002) which all find that the asset tangibility is positively related with the long-term 
leverage and negatively related with the short-term leverage. 
 
Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS) 
The non-debt tax shield gives us mixed result while checking the P-Values. P-Value with short-term 
leverage gives is 0.093 which is significant at 90% confidence interval. The result for the coefficient 
comes out to be 0.2580 that means that the non-debt tax shield is positively related with the short-term 
debt level of the firm. Increase in one unit of the non-debt tax shield will increase the short-term debt 
in the firm by .2580 units. This result is inconsistent with most of the capital structure theories. There 
are certain reasons that may lead to these results to be inconsistent. One of them could be the nature of 
the debt, as in this case, the debt for a short period, the tax advantage associated with the debt is not so 
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large in the magnitude and hence the firm look over the other advantages of choosing debt rather than 
the tax advantage. 
On the contrary the results for the long-term leverage comes out to be statistically insignificant 
because the P-Value for the regression comes out to be 0.230 and with coefficient value as (-0.3445). 
These results are consistent with almost all the theories of capital structure. Ozkan (2001), Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) and various other scholars argued that that with each unit increase in non-debt tax 
shield the utility for the debt-tax shield reduces and hence these non-debt tax shielda are inversely 
related to each other and hence the firms prefer to equity financing over debt financing. The result can 
be supported by various empirical studies such as Wald (1999) and Myers S. C. (1984). 
The main reason behind the huge contrast between our study and the various other empirical studies 
could be the use of the ratio of depreciation for the firm to total assets of the firm as the proxy for the 
non-debt tax shield. There can be other proxies for the same or the same proxy can be used as a proxy 
for some other variable. 
 
Growth Opportunities (GRO) 
For growth opportunities, we got mixed results for the P-Value for short-term leverage and long-term 
leverage. The result of P-Value for fixed effect model with short-term leverage as the dependent 
variables comes out to be 0.186. This makes the results statistically insignificant. On the other hand, 
the P-Value for the fixed effect model with long-term leverage as the dependent variable comes out to 
be 0.015 which makes it significant at 95% confidence interval. The result of long-term leverage is 
consistent with most of the theories. 
The value of coefficient for short-term leverage and long-term leverage is 0.0064 and 0.0221 
respectively. Both the values create a positive relation between the growth opportunities and leverage 
level of the firm, although the result for the short term leverage is statistically insignificant. Both the 
results are consistent with the Pecking Order Theory as the theory suggests that with high growth 
opportunities, a firm requires higher amount of capital for its functions and usually it gets difficult to 
use internal sources for financing, hence the firm opts for debt financing which is the second best 
option for financing after internal financing. Our results for the coefficient are consistent with the 
work of various scholars such as Titman and Wessels (1988) and Frank and Goyal (2003). But our 
results are not consistent with other major theory of capital structure which is the Trade-Off Theory 
which argues that the growth opportunities and leverage ratio holds a negative relation because the 
firm with growth opportunities tends to borrow less as growth opportunities is kind of intangible 
assets and cannot be collateralised for acquiring debt (Chen J. J., 2003). 
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The reason for the insignificance P-Value for the short-term leverage may be because of various 
reasons. Again, one of the most important factors is the measurement of the proxy. We used the 
growth in total assets as the proxy but there are other proxies like the growth in total sales. 
 
Earning Volatility (VOL) 
Earning volatility is negatively related to the firms leverage as earning volatility is usually used as the 
cost of financial distress and thus it is negatively related to leverage of the firm. Our estimate does not 
reveal any significant relationship between the earning volatility and the debt ratio of the firm. Even 
the coefficient values for the short-term leverage and long-term leverage gives us a positive relation 
which is inconsistent with the empirical studies and other theories in respect of capital structure. The 
coefficient value for short-term leverage is 0.00006 and for long-term leverage is 0.00003. The low 
value shows that there is negligible effect of volatility on the leverage of the firm, both short-term 
leverage and long-term leverage. The reason behind the insignificant results can be the proxy taken 
for the independent variable as there are various other substitutes mentioned in various theories. The 
unavailability of data for all the companies listed in FTSE 350 can be another reason for the 
insignificant results. Hence, there is no statistically significant relation of the earning volatility with 
either of the leverage in our study. 
5.3.5 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
ANOVA is a technique, which is used to compare the variance within as well as with different groups. 
The difference exists because of the independent variables. The main purpose of ANOVA is to know 
about whether differences exist between the samples are due to random error or whether there was 
some systematic treatment effect that caused the scores in one group different from the other group. 
For the study, we have used the following tables: 
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     Table 5.8: Results of ANOVA for both short-term and long-term leverage 
We can see from the above table the values for sum of squares, degrees of freedom, mean squares for 
both the between groups and within groups for both of our dependent variables. The significant of F 
value of 4.72 and 32.88 tells us that at least one the treatment effect is different from zero, i.e. all the 
means are not equal. The other main value of interest for us is the result of the P-Value. For us both 
the P-Values should range 0.0000 to 0.05 and in our case, both the P-Values are 0.000. This defines 
that there is significant difference in the mean scores on the dependent variables. Therefore, with the 
results we can state that there is there is a difference in mean within industries in both short-term 
leverage and long-term leverage. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Discussions 
The study was based on finding answer to the most discussed and controversial theory of finance. The 
research aimed to explain the major determinants which have an impact on the leverage ratio of the 
UK based companies. In order to provide the empirical evidence we have constructed panel data for 
178 companies listed on FTSE 350 on London Stock Exchange for a period of 10 years ranging from 
2002 to 2011. 
One of the main objectives of the study is to provide empirical evidences for the decisions which 
impacts the capital structure decisions of UK based companies. We have used various methods for the 
results. Most of the researchers used OLS method for the results which tends to provide biased results, 
so for this we have used fixed effect and random effect model. There were huge amount of theoretical 
evidences available in this field. By studying the various theories of capital structure that helped us to 
define the independent and dependent variables for our research. 
The capital structure theories were based on Pecking Order Model and Trade-Off Model. These 
models gives information regarding the debt structure of the firms although being driven by different 
forces for the prediction of the capital structure. Initially the OLS model was used to define the 
relation between the dependent and independent variables, the result from the OLS gave us all the 
independent variables as insignificant hence we used the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Test and 
Hausman Test. The result of Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Test rejected the null hypothesis and hence 
we accept the alternative hypothesis and therefore we will prefer random effect model over the OLS 
model to get our results for the determinants of the capital structure of the UK based firms. Then we 
used the Hausman Test to determine the more significant test among the fixed effect and the random 
effect model and the results proved to be in favour of the fixed effect model. 
The results for the fixed effect model for both the long-term leverage and for the short-term leverage 
provided a very small value for the R2. The reason behind the low explanatory power could be 
attributed because of the use of only book values ignoring the market values. The model showed 
various significant and insignificant values regarding the various independent variables for both long-
term and short-term leverage. The result of the fixed effect model for the short-term leverage provided 
with mixed results with some independent variable proving to be statistically significant and the rest 
not statistically significant. The non-debt tax shield, profitability and the firm size proved to 
statistically significant among the six independent variables. We can see the variables such as growth, 
profitability and firm size showing the impact on the short-term leverage in accordance of the Pecking 
Order Theory, whereas volatility, non-debt tax shield and asset tangibility are not consistent with most 
of the theories available. On the other hand, the fixed effect model for the long-term leverage showed 
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growth, profitability and firm size as the statistical significant variables. The variables like asset 
tangibility and non-debt tax shield proved to be theoretically significant. In the long-term leverage 
analysis there is a mix of Trade-Off and Pecking Order traits we can see in various independent 
variables. Tangibility and non-debt tax shield are consistent with the Trade-Off Theory and growth 
opportunities, profitability and firm size is consistent with the Pecking Order Theory. The only 
insignificant variable for both the regression comes out to be Earning Volatility. The empirical results 
for the ANOVA test for investigating the impact of industry gives us a significant and conclusive 
result. The ANOVA test showed that there is a significant difference in the mean of the short-term 
and long-term leverages within and between the industries in the sample study. 
Determinant Prediction 
Results 
short-term long-term 
Profitability +/- -* -* 
Tangibility + - + 
Growth +/- + +* 
Non-Debt 
Tax Shield - +* - 
Volatility - + + 
Firm Size +/- -* -* 
*implies statistically significant. 
 Table 5.9: Results of Fixed Effect Model with theoretical prediction and empirical research  
The table 5.9 explains the empirical research results and the results of the theories. The reason behind 
the statistically insignificant results regarding various variables and inconsistent results with the 
theories is due to various constrains and restriction in the research. The unavailability of data for 
various companies listed under the FTSE 350 and the unavailability of data for the whole ten year 
gave the research some statistically insignificant results. The problem for incomplete data arises 
because of several reasons like new born firms, dead firms and different industry.  We have also used 
book value over the market value that may have led to a low value of R2. And the values used are 
taken from the annual reports of the companies and these reports usually have the problem of biasness 
due to the accounting and public relation issues. The other important factor for the low R2 and 
statistically insignificant results is omission of other important variables such as liquidity, tax-shields, 
dividend rate, equity concentration and many more. And also the proxies used for the independent and 
dependent variables can be calculated using several measures and this might led to a low value of R2. 
We have just included the microeconomics variables and excluded the macroeconomics variables 
such as interest rate changes and inflation levels. For further studies, the research can use larger 
dataset that will overall enhance the results of this model. Future study can also increase the panel 
data set observation by adding more alternative indicators for independent variables. The research can 
utilise different proxies for a same indicator that will enhance the credibility of that indicator, 
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especially for earning volatility as the our results regarding tat independent variables shows an 
insignificant relationship with the short-term as well as long-term leverage. 
To sum up we can say that the capital structure puzzle is not an easy theory and its determinants still 
act in mysterious fashion with different datasets. With the new development in the statistical tools and 
software, the previous studies can be challenged with better results. Our empirical evidence does not 
support any particular theory for the optimal capital structure blend. Although it helped us to narrow 
down the determinants and their direction by which they will affect the short-term and long-term 
leverage of the UK based companies. However, ZHVWLOOGRQ¶WKDYHDQ\FRQFOXVLYHDQGYHU\VWUong 
result which can solve the problem of the perfect blend of the debt and equity financing. As said by 
Myers (1984)+RZGRILUPVFKRRVHWKHLUFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHV"´7KHDQVZHULV:HGRQ
WNQRZ. 
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A 
 
Appendix 
 
1. List of companies arrange in accordance of the industries. 
Basic Materials Consumer Goods 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLC ASSOCIATED BRITISH 
ANTOFAGASTA PLC BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS 
AQUARIUS PLATINUM BELLWAY PLC 
BHP BILLITON PLC BOVIS HOMES GROUP 
CRODA INTERNATIONAL BRITISH AMERICAN TOB 
ELEMENTIS PLC BRITVIC PLC 
HOCHSCHILD MIN CRANSWICK PLC 
JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC  DAIRY CREST GROUP 
KAZAKHMYS PLC DEVRO PLC 
LONMIN PLC DIAGEO PLC 
MONDI PLC GKN PLC 
PETROPAVLOVSK PLC IMPERIAL TOBACCO GRP 
RANDGOLD RESOURCES PERSIMMON PLC 
RIO TINTO PLC PZ CUSSONS PLC 
TALVIVAARA MINING RECKITT BENCKISER 
VEDANTA RESOURCES REDROW PLC 
XSTRATA PLC SABMILLER PLC  
YULE CATTO & CO PLC TATE & LYLE PLC 
  TAYLOR WIMPEY PLC  
  UNILEVER PLC 
 
Oil & Gas Technology 
AMEC PLC ANITE PLC  
BG GROUP PLC AVEVA GROUP PLC 
BP PLC COMPUTACENTER PLC 
CAPE PLC CSR PLC  
HERITAGE OIL PLC INVENSYS PLC 
HUNTING PLC LAIRD PLC  
KENTZ CORP LOGICA PLC 
PETROFAC LIMITED MICRO FOCUS INTL 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL SAGE GROUP PLC (THE) 
TULLOW OIL PLC  SDL PLC 
JOHN WOOD GROUP PLC        
 
 
B 
 
 
Telecommunications Utilities 
BT GROUP PLC CENTRICA PLC 
CABLE & WIRELESS DRAX GROUP PLC  
INMARSAT PLC  NATIONAL GRID PLC 
KCOM GROUP PLC PENNON GROUP PLC 
VODAFONE GROUP PLC  SEVERN TRENT PLC 
  SSE PLC 
  UNITED UTILITIES PLC 
 
Consumer Services Industrials 
AEGIS GROUP PLC AGGREKO PLC 
BSKYB GROUP PLC ASHTEAD GROUP PLC 
N BROWN GROUP PLC WS ATKINS PLC 
CARNIVAL PLC BABCOCK INT'L GROUP 
CARPETRIGHT PLC BAE SYSTEMS 
COMPASS GROUP PLC  BALFOUR BEATTY PLC 
DEBENHAMS PLC  BBA AVIATION 
DIGNITY PLC BERENDSEN PLC 
DIXONS RETAIL PLC BODYCOTE 
DOMINO'S PIZZA GR BUNZL PLC 
EASYJET PLC  CAPITA PLC 
EUROMONEY INSTL INV CARILLION PLC 
FIRSTGROUP PLC CHEMRING GROUP PLC 
GO-AHEAD GROUP PLC COBHAM PLC 
GREENE KING PLC COOKSON GROUP PLC 
HALFORDS GROUP PLC DE LA RUE PLC 
INCHCAPE PLC DOMINO PRINTING 
INFORMA PLC ELECTROCOMPONENTS 
INTERCONTINENTAL EXPERIAN PLC 
ITV PLC FENNER PLC 
JD SPORTS FASHION FILTRONA PLC 
KINGFISHER PLC  G4S PLC 
LADBROKES PLC GALLIFORD TRY PLC 
MARKS & SPENCER HAYS PLC 
MARSTON'S PLC HOMESERVE PLC 
MILLENNIUM HOWDEN JOINERY 
MITCHELLS & BUTLERS IMI PLC  
WM. MORRISON SUPERMT INTERSERVE PLC 
NATIONAL EXPRESS GRP INTERTEK GROUP 
NEXT PLC KIER GROUP PLC 
PEARSON PLC  MEGGITT PLC 
RANK GROUP PLC (THE) JOHN MENZIES PLC 
RESTAURANT GROUP PLC MITIE GROUP PLC 
C 
 
J SAINSBURY PLC MORGAN CRUCIBLE CO 
SPORTS DIRECT INTER OXFORD INSTRUMENTS 
STAGECOACH GROUP PLC PREMIER FARNELL PLC 
TESCO PLC  QINETIQ GROUP 
UBM PLC  REGUS PLC  
WETHERSPOON (J.D.) RENTOKIL INITIAL PLC 
WH SMITH PLC REXAM PLC  
WHITBREAD PLC ROLLS-ROYCE 
WILLIAM HILL PLC ROTORK PLC 
WPP PLC RPC GROUP PLC 
  RPS GROUP PLC 
Health Care SENIOR PLC 
ASTRAZENECA PLC SERCO GROUP PLC 
DECHRA PHARMA SHANKS GROUP PLC 
GENUS PLC SIG PLC 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE DS SMITH PLC 
HIKMA PHARMACEUTICAL SMITHS INDUSTRIES 
SHIRE PLC SPECTRIS PLC 
SMITH & NEPHEW PLC SPIRAX-SARCO ENGIN 
SYNERGY HEALTH PLC 
  
TRAVIS PERKINS PLC  
ULTRA ELECTRONICS 
  WEIR GROUP PLC (THE) 
  WOLSELEY PLC 
 
 
2. Industry classification used in the research. 
Industry Sector 
Oil & Gas Alternative Energy 
  Oil & Gas Producers 
  Oil Equipment and Service 
    
Basic Materials Chemicals 
  Forestry and Paper 
  Industrial Metal and Mining 
  Mining 
    
Industrials Aerospace & Defence 
  Construction & Materials 
  Electronic Equipment 
  General Industries 
  Industrial Engineering 
  Industrial Transportation 
  Support Service 
    
D 
 
Consumer Goods Automobile & Parts 
  Beverages 
  Food Produces 
  Household Care & Home Construction 
  Personal Goods 
  Tobacco 
    
Health Care Health Care 
  Pharmaceutical Biotechnology 
    
Consumer Services Food & Drug Retailers 
  General Retailers 
  Media 
  Travel 
    
Utilities Gas & Water & Multi-utilities 
  Electricity 
    
Technology Software 
  Technology Hardware Equipment 
    
Telecommunications Fixed Line Telecommunications 
 
 
3. Statistics table 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
 
4. Pooled OLS for Short-term Leverage 
 
 
5. Pooled OLS for Long-term Leverage 
 
6. Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Test Results for Short-Term Leverage 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0196876   .0135551     1.45   0.147    -.0068998     .046275
         SIZ      .001587   .0009141     1.74   0.083     -.000206      .00338
         PRO     .0176044   .0144725     1.22   0.224    -.0107825    .0459914
        NDTS     .0647465   .0675425     0.96   0.338     -.067734     .197227
         GRO     .0054276   .0048633     1.12   0.265    -.0041116    .0149667
         VOL     .0000227    .000125     0.18   0.856    -.0002225     .000268
         TAN    -.0058468   .0065661    -0.89   0.373    -.0187259    .0070323
                                                                              
       STLEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4.78595221  1617  .002959773           Root MSE      =   .0544
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0002
    Residual    4.76721627  1611  .002959166           R-squared     =  0.0039
       Model    .018735938     6  .003122656           Prob > F      =  0.3876
                                                       F(  6,  1611) =    1.06
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1618
. regress  STLEV TAN VOL GRO NDTS PRO SIZ
       _cons     .1943924   .0383164     5.07   0.000     .1192372    .2695476
         SIZ    -.0028939   .0025812    -1.12   0.262    -.0079568     .002169
         PRO    -.0609184   .0399957    -1.52   0.128    -.1393675    .0175308
        NDTS     .4514532   .1873934     2.41   0.016     .0838925    .8190138
         GRO    -.0060419   .0136027    -0.44   0.657    -.0327228     .020639
         VOL     .0000724   .0003501     0.21   0.836    -.0006143     .000759
         TAN      .183902   .0183034    10.05   0.000     .1480011     .219803
                                                                              
       LTLEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    41.2075555  1616  .025499725           Root MSE      =  .15186
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0956
    Residual    37.1278635  1610  .023060785           R-squared     =  0.0990
       Model    4.07969194     6  .679948656           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,  1610) =   29.49
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1617
. regress  LTLEV TAN VOL GRO NDTS PRO SIZ
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) =   329.44
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0008752       .0295836
                       e     .0021785       .0466744
                   STLEV     .0029598       .0544038
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        STLEV[name1,t] = Xb + u[name1] + e[name1,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
F 
 
 
7. Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Test Results for Long-Term Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Random Effect Results for Short-term Leverage 
 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) =  2621.67
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0155339        .124635
                       e     .0077571       .0880746
                   LTLEV     .0254997       .1596863
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        LTLEV[name1,t] = Xb + u[name1] + e[name1,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
                                                                              
         rho    .28660129   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0466744
     sigma_u    .02958364
                                                                              
       _cons     .0533456   .0223395     2.39   0.017      .009561    .0971303
         SIZ    -.0007112   .0015171    -0.47   0.639    -.0036846    .0022623
         PRO    -.0194949   .0152547    -1.28   0.201    -.0493936    .0104037
        NDTS      .203798   .0999088     2.04   0.041     .0079804    .3996156
         GRO     .0056572   .0045911     1.23   0.218    -.0033412    .0146557
         VOL     .0000622   .0001174     0.53   0.596    -.0001679    .0002923
         TAN    -.0075848   .0108417    -0.70   0.484    -.0288341    .0136645
                                                                              
       STLEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.3172
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       =      7.04
       overall = 0.0000                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0014                                        avg =       9.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.0097                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: name1                           Number of groups   =       178
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1618
. xtreg  STLEV TAN VOL GRO NDTS PRO SIZ, re
G 
 
9. Random Effect Results for Long-term Leverage 
 
10. Hausman test Results for Short-Term Leverage 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .66694747   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .08807459
     sigma_u    .12463502
                                                                              
       _cons     .2364297     .06602     3.58   0.000     .1070329    .3658265
         SIZ    -.0027147   .0044517    -0.61   0.542      -.01144    .0060105
         PRO     -.116955   .0300316    -3.89   0.000    -.1758159   -.0580942
        NDTS    -.1955734    .247264    -0.79   0.429    -.6802019    .2890552
         GRO     .0224566   .0089823     2.50   0.012     .0048517    .0400616
         VOL     .0000607   .0002273     0.27   0.789    -.0003848    .0005063
         TAN     .1181834   .0313575     3.77   0.000     .0567238    .1796429
                                                                              
       LTLEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(6)       =     35.54
       overall = 0.0696                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0970                                        avg =       9.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.0137                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: name1                           Number of groups   =       178
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1617
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0024
                          =       20.33
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         SIZ     -.0096347    -.0007112       -.0089235        .0028698
         PRO     -.0344174    -.0194949       -.0149225        .0063355
        NDTS       .258068      .203798          .05427        .1163752
         GRO      .0063646     .0056572        .0007074        .0014307
         VOL      .0000699     .0000622        7.70e-06        .0000254
         TAN     -.0195099    -.0075848       -.0119251        .0192383
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
H 
 
11. Hausman test Results for Long-Term Leverage 
 
12. Results of Fixed Effect Model for Short-Term Leverage 
 
 
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      102.40
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         SIZ     -.0083717    -.0027147        -.005657        .0041864
         PRO     -.1286924     -.116955       -.0117373        .0054002
        NDTS     -.3445766    -.1955734       -.1490032        .1450274
         GRO      .0221342     .0224566       -.0003224        .0011846
         VOL       .000031     .0000607       -.0000298               .
         TAN       .030269     .1181834       -.0879143        .0279041
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
F test that all u_i=0:     F(177, 1434) =     4.26           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho     .4019233   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0466744
     sigma_u    .03826237
                                                                              
       _cons     .1847003   .0485003     3.81   0.000     .0895611    .2798394
         SIZ    -.0096347   .0032461    -2.97   0.003    -.0160023   -.0032671
         PRO    -.0344174    .016518    -2.08   0.037    -.0668195   -.0020154
        NDTS      .258068   .1533785     1.68   0.093    -.0428022    .5589382
         GRO     .0063646   .0048089     1.32   0.186    -.0030686    .0157978
         VOL     .0000699   .0001201     0.58   0.561    -.0001657    .0003055
         TAN    -.0195099   .0220829    -0.88   0.377    -.0628281    .0238083
                                                                              
       STLEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4883                        Prob > F           =    0.0016
                                                F(6,1434)          =      3.57
       overall = 0.0008                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0055                                        avg =       9.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.0147                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: name1                           Number of groups   =       178
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1618
. xtreg  STLEV TAN VOL GRO NDTS PRO SIZ, fe
I 
 
13. Results of Fixed Effect Model for Long-Term Leverage 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(177, 1433) =    18.95           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .71984619   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .08807459
     sigma_u    .14117969
                                                                              
       _cons      .353505   .0910693     3.88   0.000     .1748615    .5321486
         SIZ    -.0083717    .006111    -1.37   0.171    -.0203591    .0036157
         PRO    -.1286924   .0305133    -4.22   0.000    -.1885478   -.0688369
        NDTS    -.3445766   .2866573    -1.20   0.230    -.9068896    .2177364
         GRO     .0221342   .0090601     2.44   0.015     .0043618    .0399067
         VOL      .000031   .0002273     0.14   0.892    -.0004149    .0004769
         TAN      .030269   .0419753     0.72   0.471    -.0520707    .1126088
                                                                              
       LTLEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1296                        Prob > F           =    0.0002
                                                F(6,1433)          =      4.50
       overall = 0.0002                                        max =        10
       between = 0.0017                                        avg =       9.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.0185                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: name1                           Number of groups   =       178
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1617
